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Abstract
With its recent decision in Roper v. Simmons, invalidating the imposition
of the death penalty on offenders who were younger than eighteen when their
crimes were committed, the U.S. Supreme Court has heralded a major shift in
the perspective of the legal system-and the culture at large-towards
adolescents who commit crimes. Invoking social science research as well as a
"common sense" understanding of the differences between teenagers and
adults, the Court found that as a categorical matter, juveniles are not as
culpable as adults and thus, cannot be classified among the "worst offenders,"
deserving of the most severe punishment. Yet, in writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy did not base the Court's decision solely on the developmental
differences between juveniles and adults or on the arguably stereotyped and
romantic notion ofyouth as immature, unpredictable works in progress. His
emphasis was also on the grave difficulty-the impossibility, even-of
maintaining confidence in a system that relies on human beings, with all their
frailties and prejudices, to determine whether the ultimate punishment should
be imposed upon society's most violent sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.
Simmons explicitly recognizes and draws a bright line to counteract the all too
human tendency to objectify violent juvenile offenders, to consider their youth
as an aggravating factor in the calculus, and to perceive and judge them
through the lens of stereotype and bias.
This Article argues that implicit bias-seeing the type or category of the
person instead of the three-dimensional reality---relates not only to how capital
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jurors perceive juvenile offenders but also to how law enforcement views the
juvenile suspect. It explains how Simmons can inform a new approach by both
law enforcement and the courts to the questioning ofjuvenile suspects, one that
is consistent with what recent studies have revealed about the ways in which
adolescents experience interrogation and is also consistent with the law's
approach to the questioning of minors who are witnesses or alleged victims of
crime. It argues that the principal bases of Simmons be applied to the area of
juvenile interrogation, and it proposes changing the culture behind the
questioning of adolescents with reforms and strategies for legislators and
judges as well as for police officers and community groups.
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. Introduction
During the past century, there have been several significant shifts in the
legal system's approach towards juvenile crime.' By the 1890s, the emerging
science of child development had been embraced by reformers and child
welfare experts alike and along with it the concept that "adolescents were 'more
like infants in their nature and needs than they were like adults' and should be
treated like children.",2 The establishment in 1899 of the country's first juvenile
court reflected this new understanding of the limitations of children and
adolescents.3 This innovative Chicago institution came to symbolize the shift
from a system in which offenders as young as seven-years-old were tried and
sentenced as adults to one which sought to protect juveniles during the "storms
of adolescence" and which championed rehabilitation-not punishment-as its
ultimate goal.4
Other swings of the pendulum were to follow, and by the 1950s, the
system was under attack yet again, with critics asserting that juveniles were
receiving neither effective rehabilitative treatment nor appropriate procedural
safeguards under the parens patriae (surrogate parent) approach of the courts.5
The lack of due process protections afforded to juveniles, combined with the
concomitant failure of juvenile courts either to reduce crime or rehabilitate
young offenders, led to the U.S. Supreme Court's 1967 landmark case, In re
Gault,6 which granted juveniles the right to counsel and the privilege against
1. Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from
Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 291, 291 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G.
Schwartz eds., 2000).
2. DAVID S. TANENHAuS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 6 (2004) (internal citations
omitted).
3. Id. at23
4. Id. at 9, 25.
5. Jessica R. Meyer, N. Dickon Reppucci & Jessica A. Owen, Criminalizing Childhood:
The Shifting Boundaries of Responsibility in the Justice and School Systems, in THE CRISIS IN
YOUTH MENTAL HEALTH: ISSUES FOR FAMILIES, SCHOOLS, AND COMMUNITIES 219, 231-32
(Kristine Freeark & William S. Davidson II eds., 2005).
6. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (holding that, in juvenile delinquency
proceedings, due process requires providing written notice of the charge to the client and
parents; notice of the child's right to counsel; the privilege against self-incrimination; and a
determination of delinquency based on sworn testimony with the opportunity for cross-
examination).
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self-incrimination.7 Gault opened the door for a second period of reform, as
legislators and courts worked to craft a model ofjuvenile justice that provided
adequate procedural protections while also emphasizing both personal
accountability and rehabilitation.8 By the 1980s, with the perceived increase in
juvenile crime and the resulting public demand for harsher penalties for
juveniles at increasingly younger ages, the political will to sustain a separate
system for youth had all but disappeared. 9 Since that time, we have seen a third
wave ofjuvenile justice reform that has brought us even further from the goal
of rehabilitation, with states transferring more juveniles into the adult system,
thereby increasing the severity and length of their prison terms.'°
7. Id.; see also Mark R. Fondacaro, Christopher Slobogin & Tricia Cross,
Reconceptualizing Due Process in Juvenile Justice: Contributions from Law and Social
Science, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 964-67 (2006) (arguing that the Court's emphasis in Gault on
providing juveniles with rights of "due process," rather than with those criminal trial rights
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, affords more flexibility in constructing a procedural
framework that is truly "context-dependent").
8. Scott, supra note 1, at 291.
9. Id. While the media has consistently asserted that juvenile crime has been on the rise
since the 1980s, research studies suggest that this claim has little or no actual merit. See, e.g.,
LORI DORFMAN & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, BUILDING BLocKs FOR YOUTH INITATIVE, OFF BALANCE:
YOUTH, RACE AND CRIME IN THE NEWS 12-16 (2001), available at http://www.
buildingblocksforyouth.org/media/media.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2008) (finding that the media
unduly connects youth to crime and violence and that people of color are overrepresented as
perpetrators and underrepresented as victims); see also MIKE A. MALES, FRAMING YOUTH: TEN
MYTHS ABOUT THE NEXT GENERATION 32 (1998) (discussing the media's mischaracterization of
youth violence during the 1990s as "soaring," when it was actually falling); Elizabeth S. Scott,
Adolescence and the Regulation of Youth Crime, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 337, 351-52 (2006) ("[The
policy of treating juvenile offenders like adults] has had the hallmarks of a moral panic, in
which politicians, the media, and the public have reinforced each other in a pattern of escalating
alarm about the seriousness of the threat of youth violence and the urgent need to respond.").
10. See, e.g., Kelly M. Angell, The Regressive Movement: When Juvenile Offenders Are
TreatedAs Adults, Nobody Wins, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 125, 127-34 (2004) (describing the
shift from rehabilitative to punitive goals in the juvenile justice system); Andrew R. Strauss,
Losing Sight of the Utilitarian Forestfor the Retributivist Trees: An Analysis of the Role of
Public Opinion in a Utilitarian Model of Punishment, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 1549, 1549-52
(2002) (describing the shift of the juvenile justice system away from a system that focused on
rehabilitation and towards one that emphasized punishment); see also Barry C. Feld, The
Juvenile Court Meets the Principal of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It
Makes, 68 B.U. L. REv. 821, 821 (1988) (analyzing the changing sentencing practices of
juvenile courts and finding an increasing focus on the offense committed, rather than on the
"best interests" and needs of the juvenile). But see Daniel M. Filler & Austin E. Smith, The
New Rehabilitation, 91 IOWA L. REv. 951,952 (2006) (arguing that the situation is not as bad as
critics of the juvenile justice system have asserted and that the rehabilitative purposes of the
juvenile justice system are still being served in specialty courts for juvenile offenders, such as
drug, gun, and mental health courts).
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With its decision in Roper v. Simmons," invalidating the imposition of the
death penalty on offenders who were younger than eighteen when their crimes
were committed, 12 the Court has, perhaps, heralded yet another shift in the
perspective of the legal system-and the culture at large-towards adolescents
who commit crimes. Invoking social science research 13 as well as a "common
sense" understanding of the differences between teenagers and adults,' 4 the
majority found that as a categorical matter, juveniles are not as culpable as
adults and thus, cannot be classified among the "worst offenders," deserving of
the most severe punishment. 5 With its recognition of the evolving nature of
juveniles' identity, character, and personality traits and their resulting capacity
for emotional growth and maturation, Simmons found it morally "misguided" to
equate the failings of minors with those of adults. 16 Overruling its 1989
11. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567-75 (2005) (affirming the decision of the
Missouri Supreme Court to set aside Christopher Simmons's death sentence in favor of life
imprisonment without parole and holding that the imposition of the death penalty on offenders
who were younger than eighteen when their crimes were committed violates the Eighth
Amendment).
12. Id.
13. See id. at 569-70 (citing the work of psychologist Jeffrey Amett in the area of
adolescent development; Laurence Steinberg and Elizabeth Scott, professors of psychology and
law respectively, in the areas of environmental and peer influences on juveniles; and Erik
Erikson on the formation ofjuvenile identity); see also ERIK ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND
CRISIS, 26-29 (1968) (discussing the formation of identity during adolescence); Jeffrey Amett,
Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV.
339, 339 (1992) (finding that adolescents demonstrate reckless and thrill-seeking behavior as
part of the development process); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by
Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AMER. PSYCHOL. 1009, 1009 (2003) (drawing on research and
theory about adolescent development to argue that the developmental immaturity ofjuveniles
mitigates their criminal culpability and, thus, calls for less severe punishment). Some scholars
have found fault with the social science research that forms the basis for Simmons. See, e.g.,
Deborah Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings ofRoper v. Simmons, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 379,
381 (2006) (contending that some of the case law and social science research in Simmons is
insufficient and outdated); Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal
Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 397-98 (2006) (exposing the
limitations of brain research and warning against over-reliance on neuroscience to explain
behavior and to lessen criminal responsibility).
14. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 572 (stating that the differences between juveniles and adults
are so "marked and well understood" that they necessitate a categorical exemption ofjuveniles
from the death penalty); see also id. at 569 ("[A]s any parent knows and as the scientific and
sociological studies... tend to confirm, '[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among
the young."' (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993))).
15. Id. at 568-70 ("These differences [between juveniles and adults] render suspect any
conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders.").
16. See id. at 570 ("From a moral standpoint, it would be misguided to equate the failings
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decision in Stanford v. Kentucky,17 which upheld the death penalty for sixteen-
and seventeen-year-olds, and relying instead on its 1988 decision in Thompson
v. Oklahoma,'8 which prohibited the death penalty for offenders fifteen-years-
old and younger, the Court called for consistency between the rights that we
deny to individuals under the age of eighteen and the responsibilities that we
assign to them. 19 In many ways, the opinion implicitly harkened back to the
approach of the country's first juvenile court when the judge's focus was not on
the audacity or savagery of the crime, but on the potential for reforming young
offenders.2 °
Yet, in writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy did not base the Court's
decision solely on the developmental differences between juveniles and adults
or on the arguably stereotyped and romantic notion of youth as immature,
unpredictable works in progress. He also emphasized the grave difficulty-the
impossibility, even--of maintaining confidence in a system that relies on
human beings, with all their frailties and prejudices, to determine whether the
ultimate punishment should be imposed upon society's most violent sixteen-
and seventeen-year-olds. 2 ! If, as Justice Kennedy contended, even psychiatric
experts are unable to differentiate between adolescent offenders who have acted
out of "unfortunate yet transient immaturity" and those for whom the crime
reflects "irreparable corruption," how can jurors reliably make such
distinctions? 22  Simmons answers this question with a categorical rule
of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's character
deficiencies will be reformed.").
17. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005).
18. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
19. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) ("[T]he reasons why juveniles are
not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their
irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult." (citing Thompson, 487
U.S. at 835)); see also id. at 569 ("In recognition of the comparative immaturity and
irresponsibility ofjuveniles, almost every State prohibits those under eighteen years of age from
voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent.").
20. Id. at 570; see also Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems 'Responses
to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189, 192-93 (1999) (describing the early juvenile justice
system as one in which "the nature of the offense affected neither the degree nor the duration of
intervention"); NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006
NATIONAL REPORT 94-96, available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/
NR2006.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2008) (describing the early juvenile justice system as having a
"focus on offenders and not offenses, on rehabilitation and not punishment," as well as "the
express purpose to protect children").
21. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 572-74.
22. See id. at 573 ("If trained psychiatrists with the advantage of clinical testing and
observation refrain, despite diagnostic expertise, from assessing anyjuvenile under 18 as having
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prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on offenders who committed
their crimes when they were younger than eighteen.23 The decision explicitly
recognizes-and draws a bright line to counteract-the all-too-human tendency
to objectify violent juvenile offenders, to consider their youth as an aggravating
factor in the calculus, and to perceive and judge them through the lens of
stereotype and bias.24
antisocial personality disorder, we conclude that States should refrain from asking jurors to
issue a far graver condemnation-that a juvenile offender merits the death penalty."). The
Simmons dissenters and other critics have suggested that Justice Kennedy usurped the jury's
role to decide on a case-by-case basis whether a defendant's youth should be mitigating with
this decision. See id. at 616, 620-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court concludes,
however,. . . that juries cannot be trusted with the delicate task of weighing a defendant's youth
along with the other mitigating and aggravating factors of his crime. This startling conclusion
undermines the very foundations of our capital sentencing system...."). Justice O'Connor
noted:
[T]hese concerns may properly be addressed not by means of an arbitrary,
categorical age-based rule, but rather through individualized sentencing in which
juries are required to give appropriate mitigating weight to the defendant's
maturity, his susceptibility to outside pressures, his cognizance of the consequences
of his actions, and so forth.
Id. at 603-04, 606-07 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Mitchel Brim, A Sneak Preview
into How the Court Took Away a State's Right to Execute Sixteen and Seventeen Year Old
Juveniles: The Threat of Execution Will No Longer Save an Innocent Victim's Life, 82 DENV.
U. L. REV. 739, 740 (2005) (asserting that the decision in Simmons inhibits justice as well as the
states' ability to "properly administer the ultimate punishment in a rational and consistent
manner for the worst of the worst on a case by case basis"); Benyomin Forer, Juveniles and the
Death Penalty: An Examination of Roper v. Simmons and the Future of Capital Punishment,
35 Sw. U. L. REv. 161, 178 (2006) (arguing that jurors should decide whether a crime warrants
a death sentence); Moin A. Yahya, Deterring Roper's Juveniles: Using a Law and Economics
Approach to Show That the Logic of Roper Implies That Juveniles Require the Death Penalty
More Than Adults, 111 PENN ST. L. REv. 53, 86 (2006) (arguing, inter alia, that juveniles react
to punishment in rational ways that are similar to the ways in which adults react to punishment,
and that by prohibiting the use of the death penalty against juveniles, the decision will further
hinder states in their efforts to combat juvenile crime); Wayne Myers, Note, Roper v. Simmons:
The Collision of National Consensus and Proportionality Review, 96 J. CRiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 947, 949 (2006) (arguing that the Simmons Court chipped away at the role of
states and juries in criminal sentencing proceedings by focusing Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence on the Justices' subjective judgment regarding the bounds of acceptable
punishment); Julie Rowe, Note, Mourning the Untimely Death of the Juvenile Death Penalty:
An Examination of Roper v. Simmons and the Future of the Juvenile Justice System, 42 CAL.
W. L. REV. 287 (2006) (arguing that the Simmons Court interfered with the function of both
state legislatures and sentencing juries in its abolition of the juvenile death penalty).
23. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 578-79.
24. Id. at 572-74. Terms such as "bias" and "stereotype" have distinct meanings and
definitions in a number of specific areas, antidiscrimination law and the law of race among
them. My conception of these terms-and use of them in this Article-shares something with
the ways in which they have been used in these contexts, while also invoking the meanings
utilized in social science literature. See Antony Page, Batson's Blind Spot: Unconscious
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This Article argues that bias-seeing the type or category of the person
instead of the three-dimensional reality-not only affects how jurors have
perceived juvenile offenders but also how law enforcement has viewed the
juvenile suspect. Recent studies on investigator bias, for example, have
established that preconceived attitudes and assumptions of police officers often
result in suggestive questioning techniques that can then lead to inaccurate
reports from witnesses and suspects.25  Researchers have also found that
juveniles and people who are intellectually impaired are especially vulnerable
to false confessions, particularly when interrogated by police and other
authority figures.26 Social scientists have shown that many in the criminal
justice system-from police officers and jurors to attorneys and judges-have
biased perceptions of children and adolescents who are involved in legal
proceedings, believing that child victims may have difficulty remembering
events but are committed to telling the truth, while juvenile suspects can
accurately recall events but are deliberately dishonest about their
recollections. 7 With such entrenched a priori beliefs held by both those who
Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U.L. REV. 155,221-36(2005) (revealing the
distinctions between the meaning of the terms "bias" and "stereotype" when used in the context
of discussing deliberate race or gender discrimination and the meaning of these terms when used
in the context of social psychological research). When law and the social sciences converge, as
in a discussion, for instance, of the impact of unconscious bias on jury selection, ever more
precise terms-such as "unconscious cognitive bias," "intergroup bias," and "attribution bias"-
are needed. Id. at 227. While an extended discussion of the various connotations of these
terms-and how they are utilized in different contexts-would be fruitful, it is beyond the scope
of this Article.
25. See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put
Innocents at Risk?, 60 AMER. PSYCHOL. 215, 219-22 (2005) (finding that investigators who
presume that the suspect is guilty are more likely to ask more guilt-presumptive questions and
exert more pressure to get a confession, thereby increasing the risk of false confession); see also
infra notes 89-106 and accompanying text (discussing interviewer bias and inaccurate
reporting).
26. See Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A
Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. IN PuB. INTEREST 33, 51-53 (2004)
(finding that juveniles are particularly susceptible to "interrogative pressure and negative
feedback" from authority figures, while intellectually impaired individuals exhibit a high need
for approval from those in positions of authority and are likely to comply with suggestive
questioning); see also infra notes 107-29 and accompanying text (discussing the particular
vulnerability of juveniles to suggestive questioning techniques).
27. See Jessica Owen-Kostelnik, N. Dickon Reppucci & Jessica R. Meyer, Testimony and
Interrogation of Minors: Assumptions About Maturity and Morality, 61 AMER. PSYCHOL. 286,
294 (2006) (citing NANCY W. PERRY & LAwRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE CHILD WITNESS:
LEGAL ISSUES AND DILEMMAS 52-54 (1991)); Kassin, supra note 25, at 215-28 (finding that
police officers and others in the criminal justice system recognize the developmental differences
between adolescents and adults in some contexts but not others); see also infra notes 160-68
and accompanying text (discussing the bias that many in law enforcement have towards alleged
THE A GE OF THE CHILD
investigate the crime and those who sit in ultimate judgment of the accused, it
is all the more important for police departments as well as the bench and bar to
be made conscious and aware of systemic bias against juvenile suspects, to
understand its impact and consequences, and to take steps to counter it.
While recent scholarship on Simmons has focused on such topics as the
significance of the Court's reliance upon international law,28 the meaning of the
holding for Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,29 or the implications of scientific
research on adolescent brain development for the legal concepts of juvenile
culpability and mens rea,3° little attention has been given to the potential
ramifications of Simmons for the functioning of the juvenile justice system at
child victims and against alleged child suspects).
28. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International
Equipoise, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1, 26 (2005) (arguing that the Court's reliance on international
values may take it down a "dangerous path"); Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl,
The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the
Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 748 (2005) (examining the
Court's historical practice of citing foreign law); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons:
Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARv. L. REV. 109, 112 (describing three models of
considering international law and determining that the Simmons court properly considered
international law); Greta Proctor, Reevaluating Capital Punishment: The Fallacy of a
Foolproof System, the Focus on Reform, and the International Factor, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 211,
219-34 (2007) (advocating the abolition of the death penalty and discussing the Court's
analysis of international law in Roper v. Simmons); Jacob J. Zehnder, Comment, Constitutional
Comparativism: The Emerging Risk of Comparative Law as a Constitutional Tiebreaker, 41
VAL. U. L. REV. 1739, 1761 (2007) (discussing constitutional comparative law and
characterizing Roper v. Simmons as one of "[t]he three most significant death penalty cases
invoking the Courts' comparative reasoning").
29. See, e.g., Wayne Myers, Roper v. Simmons: The Collision of National Consensus
and Proportionality Review, 96 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 947, 949 (2006) (arguing that
Simmons has resulted in a "fundamental alteration of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence," with
its focus now on subjective determinations regarding the bounds of acceptable punishment);
Ronald Turner, The Juvenile Death Penalty and the Court's Consensus-Plus Eighth
Amendment, 17 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 157, 159 (2006) (analyzing Simmons's
construction and application of the Eighth Amendment in the specific context ofjuvenile death
penalty); Daniel R. Williams, Roper v. Simmons and the Limits of the Adjudicatory Process,
2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (2005) (discussing the meaning and significance of the
Court's reasoning in Simmons in the context of its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence); Jason
Mazingo, Student Article, Roper v. Simmons: The Height of Hubris, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. 261,
283 (2005) (examining the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and calling for the
abolition of the national consensus standard in light of the "capricious" decision in Simmons).
30. See, e.g., Denno, supra note 13, at 383-85 (criticizing the Supreme Court's reliance
on scientific amici briefs in Simmons); Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd,
Neurobiology and the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321,332 (2006)
(arguing that brain development should be carefully considered in criminal cases involving
juvenile offenders); see also Aliya Haider, Roper v. Simmons: The Role of the Science Brief, 3
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 370 (2006) (discussing the approach of the authors of an amicus brief
submitted in Simmons on behalf of the scientific community).
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large-specifically in the area of criminal procedure.3' While there are many
directions that one could go when importing Simmons's holding to other areas
of theory or doctrine, this Article considers the implications of the majority's
recognition that age matters not only for juveniles already in the system but for
juveniles not yet charged-for those under suspicion, identified as suspects,
and questioned by law enforcement. It explores how Simmons might inform a
new approach by both law enforcement and the courts to the questioning of
juvenile suspects, one that is consistent with what recent studies have revealed
about the ways in which adolescents experience interrogation and is also
consistent with the law's approach to the questioning of minors who are
witnesses or alleged victims of crime.
As Part II explains, the majority's decision in Roper v. Simmons was
based not only on the significance of the differences between adolescents and
adults but also on the reality that, despite explicit statutory and case law, the
state may characterize an adolescent offender's youth-and the jury may
perceive it-as an aggravating factor, not a mitigating one. Part III discusses
the phenomenon of interviewer bias and argues that because juveniles are
particularly vulnerable to its effects-similar to the way in which they are
vulnerable to the effects of juror bias in cases such as Simmons-appropriate
procedural protections must be provided during questioning, whether the
31. A Lexis search of law reviews and journals located only a couple of articles and
several student notes that have focused on the potential impact of Simmons on the juvenile
justice system at large, with few, if any, focused specifically on criminal procedure. See, e.g.,
Ellen Marrus & Irene Merker Rosenberg, After Roper v. Simmons: Keeping Kids Out ofAdult
Criminal Court, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1151, 1182 (2005) (arguing that Simmons supports
extending juvenile court jurisdiction to all those under age eighteen and prohibiting the
imposition of life imprisonment without parole on juveniles); Lisa McNaughton, Extending
Roper's Reasoning to Minnesota's Juvenile Justice System, 32 WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 1063,
1071-72 (2006) (relying on Simmons to argue that Minnesota's automatic certification of
juveniles to adult court for certain charges and laws requiring juveniles to register as sex
offenders are unconstitutional); Hillary J. Massey, Note, Disposing of Children: The Eighth
Amendment and Juvenile Life Without Parole After Roper, 47 B.C. L. REv. 1083, 1086-87
(2006) (exploring the impact of Simmons on sentencing juveniles to life without parole); Enrico
Paguanelli, Note, Children As Adults: The Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Courts and the
Potential Impact of Roper v. Simmons, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 175, 186-94 (2007) (discussing
the implications of Simmons on the transfer of juveniles to criminal court); Rowe, supra note
22, at 287 (criticizing Simmons and suggesting that other forms of punishment imposed on
juvenile offenders may also be struck down prematurely as a result of the decision). As noted
above, scholarship has been produced on other aspects of Simmons. See, e.g., Elizabeth F.
Emens, Aggravating Youth: Roper v. Simmons andAge Discrimination, 2005 Sup. CT. REV.
51, 54-55 (2005) (exploring the connection between age discrimination law and the Court's
preference in Simmons for an age-based rule that exempts minors from the death penalty over a
standard that allows juries to determine whether and to what extent to consider age as
mitigating).
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juvenile is a victim, witness, or suspect. Part IV argues that courts reinforce
interviewer bias when they fail to hold that a juvenile suspect's youth is
determinative in evaluating whether the police have overstepped their bounds
during interrogation through its analysis of recent cases both prior to and since
Simmons. Part V proposes measures aimed at changing the culture of police
interrogation of adolescents with proposals and strategies for legislators and
judges as well as for law enforcement and community groups. Part VI
concludes.
II. Roper v. Simmons: Drawing the Line at Eighteen
On its face, Roper v. Simmons appears to have followed traditional lines of
analysis in arriving at its principal holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were
younger than eighteen when their crimes were committed. In its majority
opinion, the Court moved from a discussion of "evolving standards of
decency," to a numeric analysis of whether "national consensus" exists on the
issue, to the conclusion that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical
exemption for juveniles.32 The symmetry of its rejection of Stanford v.
Kentucky 33 and Penry v. Lynaugh, 4 cases that upheld the constitutionality of
the death penalty as applied to sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders and
the mentally retarded respectively, and its reliance on Thompson v. Oklahoma
35
and Atkins v. Virginia,36 cases that found the death penalty unconstitutional
when applied to offenders under the age of sixteen and the mentally retarded
respectively, holds no real surprise.
What is striking about Simmons-and most relevant to the area ofjuvenile
interrogation-is the Court's emphasis upon the differences between
adolescents and adults in the areas of psychosocial and brain development and
32. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564, 568, 578-79 (2005).
33. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,380 (1989) ("We discern neither a historical
nor a modem societal consensus forbidding the imposition of capital punishment on any person
who murders at 16 or 17 years of age. Accordingly, we conclude that such punishment does not
offend the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment."), abrogated
by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
34. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-35 (1989) (holding that the execution of
mentally retarded people is not categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment), abrogated
by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
35. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,815 (1988) (holding that the execution of
offenders aged fifteen and younger is unconstitutional).
36. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317-21 (2002) (holding that the execution of
mentally retarded individuals violates the Eighth Amendment).
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its determination that a categorical rule is necessary to protect juvenile
offenders from the biases of decisionmakers.37 This Part analyzes the decision,
explores its reasoning, and then sets the stage for the Article's subsequent
discussion of how Simmons might inform a new understanding of and approach
to the interrogation of juveniles. It examines the Court's characterization of
youth as immature, unpredictable, and impressionable to argue for and
ultimately embrace the view that capital punishment cannot be applied to the
oldest adolescents, sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.3 8 It then discusses the
Court's holding that allowing capital jurors, who may be overcome by the
particularly brutal nature of the crime, to decide whether a young offender
should be put to death challenges the bounds of morality.39
A. The Profound Differences Between Adolescents and Adults
Before discussing the Court's delineation of the differences between
adolescents and adults in Simmons, it is necessary to review Thompson v.
Oklahoma, as it plays a critical role in the Court's opinion. To begin, it is
important to recognize that the majority in Thompson, which set sixteen as the
minimum age for which capital punishment could be imposed, had an easier
hurdle to overcome than that confronted by the Court in Simmons, for its focus
was on younger teenagers, a group that state legislatures and juries had, in large
part, already determined to be in a different, "less culpable" category than older
40adolescents and adults. In concluding that the imposition of the death penalty
on a fifteen-year-old offender was "generally abhorrent to the conscience of the
community,'01 Thompson relied principally upon three areas: rights-granting
legislation that set the line between childhood and adulthood either at sixteen or
37. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569-75 ("An unacceptable likelihood exists that the
brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments
based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender's objective immaturity,
vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe than death.").
38. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572-74 (2005). See discussion infra Part II.A.
39. Id. at 572-74; see discussion infra Part II.B.
40. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823-33 (discussing legislation that sets sixteen as the age for
which a number of different rights accrue); see also Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Public Attitudes
About the Culpability and Punishment of Young Offenders, 24 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 815, 827
(2006) (describing a study examining society's perception of the punishments that adolescents
should receive for adult crimes, and concluding that few of the adults surveyed supported the
adult prosecution of twelve-year-olds--even for murder-and that the mean minimum age
recommended for transferring juveniles to adult court was sixteen).
41. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 832 (1988).
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above;42 the infrequency with which offenders under sixteen had been executed
in the United States;43 and the behavior of juries, which in recent years had
voted to execute only 0.3% of those under sixteen who had been charged with
willful criminal homicide. 44 Although Thompson also found that adolescents,
particularly those in their early and middle teens, were "less mature and
responsible than adults," citing experts in the areas of adolescent psychology
and neuropsychiatry to support its view, this emphasis was less central to its
final conclusion than the previously stated bases.45
In Simmons, Justice Kennedy relied heavily on the precedent and language
of Thompson but took the reasoning of the 1988 decision one step further, as
the exemption of all juveniles under the age of eighteen required bolder claims
to support its more far-reaching conclusion.46 Kennedy began with a discussion
of society's "'evolving standards of decency' . . . to determine which
punishments are so disproportionate so as to be cruel and unusual. '47 He
analyzed "objective [indicia] of national consensus" on the issue, which
included a tabulation of how many states have proscribed the death penalty for
48juveniles and at what pace, an analytic process comparable to that followed in
42. See id. at 823-25 (acknowledging that while "[tihe line between childhood and
adulthood is drawn in different ways by various States," almost all the states treat those under
sixteen as minors for such important purposes as voting, serving on a jury, driving without
parental consent, and marrying without parental consent).
43. See id. at 832 (noting that there have been no executions for crimes committed by
offenders under the age of sixteen since 1948).
44. Id. at 832-33, 833 n.39 (citing Department of Justice statistics to show that this
percentage means that five of the 1861 people "under [sixteen] who were arrested for willful
criminal homicide received the death penalty").
45. Id. at 834-35 (stating that because of the "special mitigating force of youth," the
conclusion that "less culpability should attach to a crime committed by ajuvenile than. . . by an
adult.., is too obvious to require extended explanation").
46. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) ("The logic of Thompson extends to
those who are under [eighteen].").
47. Id. at 561-64 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
48. Id. at 564-67. What is arguably different about Justice Kennedy's analysis, as
compared with Thompson and Atkins, and what both Justices O'Connor and Scalia objected to
in their respective dissenting opinions, is the reasoning Kennedy employed to conclude that the
national tide had shifted in regard to attitudes towards the juvenile death penalty. In
determining that thirty states had prohibited the juvenile death penalty by the time of the
Simmons decision, Kennedy included the twelve states that had rejected capital punishment
altogether, along with the eighteen that had maintained it but had specifically excluded juveniles
from its reach. Id. at 564. While Atkins had utilized the same method of calculation and
produced parallel results, the rate of abolition of the death penalty for the mentally retarded was
much more dramatic between the Penry and Atkins decisions (sixteen states had prohibited the
practice in the intervening three years) than the rate of abolition of the juvenile death penalty
between Stanford and Simmons (only five states had prohibited the practice in the intervening
fifteen years, one of which did so through a judicial decision, not a legislative enactment). Id. at
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the Court's earlier opinions addressing the proper reach and parameters of the
Eighth Amendment,49 and he ultimately concluded that a national consensus
had, in fact, developed against the juvenile death penalty.
50
Justice Kennedy then introduced one of the central arguments of the
Court's opinion, that because juveniles under eighteen are fundamentally
different from adults, the classic rationale for imposing "the death penalty
appl[ies] to them with lesser force than to adults."51 Relying on neuro-
psychiatric and psychosocial assessments of death-row inmates as well as
imaging studies exploring brain maturation in adolescents, Kennedy set forth
three principal areas of difference to support the Court's conclusion that
juveniles cannot be classified "among the worst offenders": juveniles' "lack of
565. To justify his contention that these numbers demonstrated sufficient evidence of
consensus, Kennedy emphasized the "consistency of the direction of change" as supported by
the fact that since Stanford, no state that previously had prohibited the juvenile death penalty
had since reinstated it. Id. at 566. Kennedy ultimately concluded that based on the
aforementioned "objective indicia of consensus," juveniles-like the mentally retarded in
Atkins-are viewed by society as "categorically less culpable than the average criminal." Id. at
567 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).
49. Id. at 564-67. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-98 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (concluding that because Georgia was the only state authorizing the death penalty for
raping an adult woman and because Georgia juries had not imposed the death sentence in a vast
majority [90%] of rape convictions, the death penalty was a "grossly disproportionate and
excessive punishment" for that crime); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-35 (1989)
(concluding that, as there was "insufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing
mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses" (in 1989, only two states banned the
execution of retarded persons), it is not categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment),
abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,
369-78 (1989) (holding that because "a majority of the States that permit capital punishment
[also] authorize it" for murders committed at ages sixteen and seventeen, the practice does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
50. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 567. Justice O'Connor rejected Justice Kennedy's claim of
sufficient evidence of national consensus based not only on a comparison with the numbers in
Atkins but also on the argument that even the "strong evidence" of consensus that existed in
Atkins justified that decision only when combined with the moral proportionality argument-
that the execution of the mentally retarded, because of their significant cognitive and behavioral
deficits, would not measurably contribute to the goals of retribution and deterrence-and that
the proportionality argument against the juvenile death penalty was findamentally"flawed" and
"too weak" to warrant the Court's categorical rule. Id. at 593-94, 597-98 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Justice O'Connor also took issue with Kennedy's interpretation of the objective
legislative evidence, finding it significant that, unlike in Atkins, there was "some measure of
continuing public support" for applying the death penalty to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.
Id. at 595-96 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). She cited the fact that at least seven states-two since
Stanford-specifically had set sixteen or seventeen as the minimum age at which an offender
could be exposed to the death penalty, that five of these seven states had at least one juvenile
offender presently on death row, and that four of them had executed at least one juvenile
offender in the past fifteen years. Id. at 595-96 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
51. Id.at571.
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maturity... and underdeveloped sense of responsibility result[s] in impetuous
and ill-considered actions and decisions" ;52 juveniles' increased vulnerability
and susceptibility to negative influences (i.e., peer pressure) makes them more
worthy of forgiveness for falling prey to those influences;53 and because
juveniles' characters are not as well-formed as adults and their personality traits
52. Id. at 569 (citing Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). In her dissent, Justice
O'Connor objected to the Court's "sweeping conclusion" that only in "rare" cases might a
juvenile offender have the maturity and demonstrate the depravity to warrant a sentence of
death, stating that "[t]he fact that juveniles are generally less culpable for their misconduct than
adults does not necessarily mean that a 17-year-old murderer cannot be sufficiently culpable to
merit the death penalty." Id. at 599 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor found this to be
particularly so for those "at the margins between adolescents and adulthood-and especially for
17-year-olds such as [Simmons]." Id. at 600 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Relying on the facts of
the murder, which she characterized as "premeditated, wanton, and cruel in the extreme," and on
Simmons's belief, albeit erroneous, that he could kill with impunity because he was a minor,
O'Connor found that a sentencing jury could reasonably conclude that Simmons was both
sufficiently mature and sufficiently depraved to merit a death sentence. Id. at 600-01
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Therefore, she also found that it was reasonable for a legislature to
conclude that some seventeen-year-old murderers merited the death penalty and that Christopher
Simmons appeared to be one of them. Id. at 600 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 569-70. One of Justice Scalia's more provocative-and persuasive-arguments
in dissent was made on the subject of Justice Kennedy's reliance on scientific and sociological
studies to establish that juveniles are too impressionable and unformed to warrant the death
penalty. Scalia pointedly rejected Kennedy's adoption of this characterization of adolescents,
both on the basis of the methodological inadequacy of the Court's cited support for its claims as
well as on the grounds that Kennedy had merely privileged one stereotyped notion of
adolescents over another. See id. at 616-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A]II the Court has done
today, to borrow from another context, is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out its
friends."). Anticipating arguments made by everyone from so-called "youth liberationists"-
children's rights advocates who work to advance the autonomy and self-determination of young
people-to abortion rights advocates troubled by the suggestion that juveniles are incapable of
taking moral responsibility for their actions, Scalia referenced studies and treatises that directly
contradicted the Court's conclusions, including ones relied upon in previous cases by Simmons
amici. See id. at 617-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the American Psychological
Association, which in Simmons asserted that minors "lack the ability to take moral responsibility
for their [actions]," had taken the opposite position in an amicus brief filed in an earlier case
before the Court). In challenging a parental notification requirement in a Minnesota abortion
law, the American Psychological Association's brief stated that "[p]sychological theory and
research about cognitive, social and moral development strongly supports the conclusion that
most adolescents are competent to make informed decisions about important life situations" and
that decisions regarding the ability of adolescents to understand and make decisions about
intellectual and social dilemmas and to reason through hypothetical situations should be made
on a case-by-case basis. Brief for Am. Psychological Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners/Cross-Respondents at 18-21, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (Nos. 88-
1125 & 88-1309), 1989 WL 1127529; see also Emens, supra note 31, at 70-72 (discussing the
criticisms of Kennedy's generalizations of youth that have come from proponents of youth
liberation). Kennedy's failure to anticipate and respond to these points is a legitimate weakness
of the majority opinion.
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are more transitory and less fixed, their commission of heinous crimes is not
evidence of "irretrievably depraved character[s]. '54
Echoing the Court's reasoning in Atkins v. Virginia as applied to the
mentally retarded, Kennedy also advanced an argument based on the concept of
moral proportionality, that given the "diminished culpability ofjuveniles," the
penological justifications for capital punishment-retribution and deterrence of
capital offenses-fail to resonate with regard to this age group." If retribution
54. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70(2005). As for the third area of difference,
Justice Kennedy wrote, "From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings
of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater probability exists that a minor's character
deficiencies will be reformed." Id. at 570 (emphasis added). The claim that most teenagers who
exhibit antisocial behavior will "grow out of it" and that "the cure for youth crime is growing
up" is supported by the findings of social scientists. See, e.g., Steinberg & Scott, supra note 13,
at 1014 ("For most teens, [risky, illegal, or dangerous] behaviors are fleeting; they cease with
maturity as individual identity becomes settled. Only a relatively small proportion of
adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal activities develop entrenched patterns of problem
behavior that persist into adulthood."); Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the
Young Offender. Notes on Immaturity, Capacity, andDiminishedResponsibility, in YOUTH ON
TRIAL 271, 283-84 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (recommending that a
"rich mixture of risk-management strategies," rather than purely punitive responses, be utilized
to reduce the harmful consequences of youth crime). Zimring observes:
[T]he high prevalence of offense behavior in the teen years and the rather high rates
of incidence for those who offend are transitory phenomena associated with a
transitional status and life period. Even absent heroic interventions, the conduct
that occurs at peak rates in adolescence will level off substantially if and when
adolescents achieve adult roles and status.
Id. at 283.
55. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 571-72 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,319 (2002)).
In her dissent, O'Connor argued that drawing a line between seventeen-year-olds and young
adults was "indefensibly arbitrary," as it was based on chronological age alone, and that it was
fundamentally different than drawing a line between the mentally retarded and those without
intellectual impairments, a distinction she saw as inherent or definitional. Id. at 601-02
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). While she summarily rejected Kennedy's contention that an
arbitrary line may be necessary-and possibly morally compelled-in the very specific context
of applying the death penalty to minors, id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting), O'Connor failed to
acknowledge that it is not always clear or universally agreed upon who should be diagnosed as
mentally retarded and who should not, evidenced by the fact that the very definition of mental
retardation, which typically refers to both intellectual and adaptive functioning, can differ from
state to state. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3, 317 n.22, 318 (discussing characteristics of
mental retardation); id. at 317 (leaving to the states the development of mechanisms to
determine which offenders fall within the class of mentally retarded persons exempt from capital
punishment); Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded
Offenders and Excluding Them from Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 89-93 (2003) (analyzing the
differences between states' definitions of mental retardation both before and after Atkins);
Christopher L. Chauvin, Note, Atkins v. Virginia: How Flawed Conclusions Convert Good
Intentions Into Bad Law, 65 LA. L. REv. 473, 503-04 (2004) (noting that following Atkins,
some states adopted the American Association on Mental Retardation's (AAMR) definition of
mental retardation referred to in the opinion). Other states have established their own
400
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is viewed alternatively as an expression of "the community's moral outrage"
and an "attempt to right the wrong to the victim," the death penalty's
application to juveniles is disproportionate because their "blameworthiness" is
diminished by their very youth and immaturity.56 Similarly, with regard to
deterrence, Kennedy asserted that the teenager's ability to perform a "cost-
benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so
remote as to be virtually nonexistent. "57
In sum, the primary argument put forward by the Simmons majority, that
the exemption of all minors from the death penalty is necessitated by the
profound psychological and developmental differences between adolescents
and adults, finds its roots in Thompson v. Oklahoma, although Kennedy gave it
more prominence in Simmons than in any previous Eighth Amendment opinion
by the Court.
B. Countering Jurors' Implicit Bias Against Young Offenders
The second of Justice Kennedy's principal bases for the majority opinion
was his contention that jurors should not be relied upon to decide which young
offenders have committed crimes that are deserving of death.58 That Kennedy
began the opinion by recounting the rather harrowing facts of the murder of
Shirley Crook speaks to the question of whether capital jurors should have the
discretion to decide which juvenile offenders should be executed as well as to
the matter of the proper weight that a defendant's youth should be given in the
death penalty calculus.
In the opinion, Kennedy described the murder of Shirley Crook at the
hands of Christopher Simmons in uncompromising detail. He portrayed
seventeen-year-old Simmons, a high school junior, as the "instigator of the
crime," someone who spoke in "chilling, callous terms" about his plan,
definitions, which can differ significantly from the AAMR definition. Ohio, for instance, has
adopted an approach that focuses on IQ scores, while Oklahoma's standards do not include IQ
scores at all. Chauvin, supra, at 503-04; Cynthia A. Orpen, Note, Following in the Footsteps of
Ford: Mental Retardation and Capital Punishment Post-Atkins, 65 U. PrrT. L. REv. 83, 91-97
(2003) (identifying the sources of inconsistencies in states' definitions of mental retardation as
well as in sentencing guidelines for the mentally retarded). For a list of states that have acted in
accordance with Atkins by changing their statutes, see Death Penalty Information Center, States
That Have Changed Their Statutes to Comply With the Supreme Court's Decision in Atkins v.
Virginia, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=28&did=668 (last visited Jan. 12,
2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
56. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 571.
57. Id. at 571-72 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988)).
58. Id. at 572-74.
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asserting that he "wanted to murder someone" and believing that he and his
friends could "get away with it" because they were minors.59 On September 9,
1993, Simmons and another boy, fifteen-year-old Charles Benjamin, entered
Shirley Crook's home at two a.m. after reaching through an open window to
unlock the back door.60 Crook, alone in the house, called out "Who's there?"
after being awakened when Simmons turned on a hallway light.6' Simmons
recognized Crook as someone with whom he had been in a minor automobile
accident and later said that "this confirmed his resolve to kill her. ' 62 He and
Benjamin duct-taped Crook's eyes and mouth and bound her hands before
driving in her minivan to a state park.63 They then "reinforced the bindings,
covered her head with a towel, and brought her to a railroad trestle [that
crossed] the Meramec River. ''64 There they tied together her hands and feet
with electrical wire and threw her from the bridge where she drowned in the
water below. 65 Later that day, Crook's husband, Steven, returning from an
overnight trip, found his bedroom in shambles, and reported his wife missing.
66
Shirley Crook's body was found in the river later that day by a fisherman.67
Meanwhile, Simmons bragged to friends that he had killed a woman "because
the bitch seen my face.
68
Justice Kennedy's willingness to provide a full recitation of the facts and
circumstances of the murder is significant, as it diverges from the pattern and
practice established in Thompson and Atkins in which Justice Stevens, writing
for the majority, provided only a brief statement of the facts,69 while Justice





64. Id. at 557.
65. Id. at 556-57.
66. Id. at 557.
67. Id.
68. Id.; see Respondent's Statement, Brief, and Argument at 7-12, State ex rel. Simmons
v. Luebbers, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (No. SC 84454), 2003 WL 24219768
(recounting the details of the crime as told by Simmons to friends during September 1993); see
also Brief for Petitioner at 3-5, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004
WL 903158 (same); Brief for Respondent at 1-9, Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004
WL 1947812 (same; also noting psychiatrists' evaluation of Simmons as "very immature" and
noting his "dysfunctional home environment").
69. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 819 (1998) ("Because there is no claim
that the punishment would be excessive if the crime had been committed by an adult, only a
brief statement of facts is necessary."); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002)
(describing the murder in only two sentences).
THE AGE OF THE CHILD
Scalia, writing for the dissent, countered with fuller, more graphic versions of
the violence perpetrated by the defendants and the testimony introduced against
them at trial.70 In the context of Thompson and Atkins, cases in which the death
penalty was found to be cruel and unusual as a categorical matter, Stevens'
decision not to include the specifics of the crime is consistent with the Court's
ultimate holding that regardless of the amorality of the murderous act, this
particular category of offenders must be exempt from execution. 71 In contrast,
Scalia's decision to provide detailed descriptions of the crimes advanced his
argument that the true culpability and depravity of an offender will only be
revealed through a close examination of the offense, 72 a truth that-by his
lights-the majority refused to confront when it determined to substitute its
judgment for that of both legislators and jurors.73 In this way, Kennedy's
inclusion of the full factual narrative in Simmons in a sense preempted Scalia,
70. In both decisions, Justice Stevens briefly described the charges and the facts of the
crime followed by a short statement of the case history, while Justice Scalia provided a blow-by-
blow account of the crime as well as the evidence presented at trial and at resentencing,
including verbatim quotes from the suspect and witnesses made before, during, and after the
crime was committed. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 859-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (including
incriminating after-the-fact statements made by the defendant); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 338-
39 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the defendant "ignored [the victim's] pleas to leave him
unharmed").
71. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838 ("[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
the execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or her offense."); see
also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (concluding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a state from
executing a mentally retarded offender).
72. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 859-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I begin by restating the
facts since I think that a fuller account of William Wayne Thompson's participation in the
murder, and of his certification to stand trial as an adult, is helpful in understanding the case.");
see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I begin with a brief restatement of [the]
facts that are abridged by the Court but important to understanding this case."). Justice
Rehnquist also made a practice of detailing the violent facts of the crime in death penalty cases,
presumably for the same reasons that motivated Justice Scalia. See, e.g., Barclay v. Florida, 463
U.S. 939, 942-44 (1983) (incorporating long excerpts of tape recordings made by the
defendants, members of the Black Liberation Army, discussing their killing of the victim as well
as extensive comments of the trial judge condemning the defendants' attempt to initiate a "racial
war"). Interestingly, in cases involving juveniles-even ones in which the facts were not
relevant to the issues presented-Justice Rehnquist made a practice of emphasizing both the
crime's brutality and the offender's youth. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256-60
(1984) (detailing the delinquency histories of each of the three young appellees in an opinion
that concluded that a New York pretrial detention statute was not unconstitutional as applied to
juveniles).
73. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 873 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("On its face, the phrase 'cruel
and unusual punishments' limits the evolving standards appropriate for our consideration to
those entertained by the society rather than those dictated by our personal consciences."); see
also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 341-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's use of statistics
and studies "to fabricate 'national consensus"').
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who provided no additional facts in his dissent, while also setting the stage for
Kennedy's argument that adolescent offenders must be categorically exempted
from the death penalty because the very nature of a particularly brutal and
abhorrent crime can, indeed, overpower-in the minds of jurors-mitigating
arguments made on behalf of a defendant. 74
The purported catalyst for Kennedy's argument that a bright line is needed
to protect juveniles from execution was the exchange that occurred between the
defense attorney and prosecutor during the penalty phase of Christopher
Simmons's trial. Defense counsel told the jury that "Simmons' age should
make 'a huge difference to [them] in deciding just exactly what sort of
punishment to make.' 0 5 In response, the prosecutor argued the following:
"Age, he says. Think about age. Seventeen years old. Isn't that scary?
Doesn't that scare you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the
contrary.' 7 6 Kennedy referred to these statements in his narrative of the facts
and then invoked them later in the opinion when asserting that while this sort of
prosecutorial "overreaching" might be corrected by the application of a
particular rule, it would not address the Court's larger concern that the criminal
justice system is unable with sufficient reliability to identify those juveniles for
whom a death sentence would be appropriate.77
74. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,573 (2005) ("An unacceptable likelihood exists
that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating
arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender's objective
immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe than
death."); see also Robin West, Narrative, Responsibility and Death: A Comment on the Death
Penalty Cases from the 1989 Term, MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161, 173-76 (1990)
(discussing liberal dissenters' failure in death penalty decisions to provide a "counter-narrative"
to that of the conservative majority opinion which details the victim's horrific death, and calling
for the dissenters to "construct an alternative understanding of societal responsibility for
criminality that might challenge the unbridled individualism" of the majority's narrative).
75. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 558 (internal citations omitted).
76. Id.; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 68, at 4 (describing the prosecutor as
exhorting the jury in closing argument not to let Simmons "use his age as a shield to protect
him"); Ashley Dobbs, The Use of Youth as an 4ggravating Factor in Death Penalty Cases
Involving Minors, Juv. JUST. UPDATE, June/July 2004, at 1, 14-15 (discussing how the
prosecutor in Simmons made youth an aggravating factor by appealing to the jurors' basic fear
of the irrational conduct of children, fear resulting from their impetuosity, unpredictability, and
inability to understand the consequences of their actions-all qualities "that should reduce their
culpability, not augment it").
77. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 573. Instances in which prosecutors characterize ajuvenile's
youth as an aggravating-rather than a mitigating-factor are hardly limited to the case of
Christopher Simmons; there are many such examples. See, e.g., Exparte Davis, 866 S.W.2d
234, 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc) (finding that a Texas prosecutor improperly secured
commitments during voir dire from all twelve eventual jurors that they "would not let the
'youthful appearance and age of a defendant.., affect [their] deliberations on punishment"');
see also Dobbs, supra note 76, at 15 (describing instances in which prosecutors argued to the
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Consistent with other aspects of his argument in Simmons, Kennedy found
that statutes and court decisions intended to ensure that capital jurors do not
perceive a juvenile offender's youth as aggravating have little impact on the
very real risk that at least some jurors will judge the worth of a violent
adolescent through the lens of bias and stereotype-and that at least some will
consider it scary that an individual who was so young could commit a crime
that was so brutal. 78  Kennedy foresaw that this potential risk would be
jury in closing that the youth of the defendant was aggravating, not mitigating).
78. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 572-73. There are explicit rules that direct capital jurors as to
how to weigh the evidence introduced by each side at sentencing; state statutes specifically
enumerate what circumstances are to be considered aggravating and clearly instruct the
sentencer to weigh the mitigating evidence introduced by a defendant against the aggravating
circumstances proved by the state. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01 (Supp. 2007)
(describing the process by which the trier of fact weighs mitigating and aggravating
circumstances during sentencing and referencing §§ 13-702 & 13-703(f), which list the relevant
aggravating and mitigating circumstances); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (2001 & Supp.
2006) (requiring juries to first determine whether aggravating circumstances exist-"including,
but not limited to" those listed in the statute-then whether aggravating circumstances outweigh
mitigating factors); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 2006) (mandating that juries in capital
cases weigh both mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and detailing what constitutes
each); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515 (2004 & Supp. 2007) (requiring the trier of fact to weigh
mitigating factors against aggravating ones, and enumerating specific aggravating
circumstances); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (2005) (requiring the trier of fact to weigh
mitigating factors against aggravating factors, and enumerating specific mitigating as well as
aggravating circumstances). Of the thirteen states that currently have juveniles on death row
(out of nineteen that allow minors to be executed), ten have statutes that "specifically identify
youth as a mitigating factor to be considered by the sentencer." Dobbs, supra note 76, at 14.
Even if youth is not enumerated as a statutory mitigator, it is a "constitutional requirement" that
the defendant's age be "one of the individualized mitigating factors that sentencers... be
permitted to consider." Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,375 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982)), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Similarly, case law has made it explicit that the Eighth Amendment requires the sentencer
to consider in mitigation the defendant's youth, as well as family history and mental and
emotional development, during the sentencing hearing. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (holding that a defendant's youth or immaturity is paradigmatic
evidence of constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635
(1979) (finding that a state statute that precludes the consideration of relevant mitigating factors
required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments does not meet constitutional requirements);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (finding that a sentencer in a capital case must be
permitted to give full effect to all constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence); see also Farina
v. State, 801 So. 2d 44, 56 (Fla. 2001) (stating that "[in Florida], when a defendant is sixteen
years of age, his or her youth is such a substantial mitigating factor that it cannot be outweighed
by any set of aggravating circumstances as a matter of law" (citing Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d
1 (Fla. 1999))); State v. Nicholson, 558 S.E.2d 109, 145 (N.C. 2002) (stating that, in
considering the statutory mitigating factor of age, a jury may also take into account the
defendant's experience and emotional maturity); State v. Raglin, 699 N.E.2d 482, 497 (Ohio
1998) (finding that "appellant's troubled childhood, history, and family background are entitled
to some meaningful weight in mitigation"); State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 842 (Tenn. 2002)
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compounded by the fact that, almost by definition, the evidence introduced during
capital cases is difficult to evaluate objectively, as the details put forward by the
state are particularly violent and disturbing. Subsequently, the sheer "brutality [and]
cold-blooded nature" of the crime has the capacity to overcome the mitigating
arguments presented on behalf of the offender, and as a result, "a defendant's youth
may even be counted against him. 79 Kennedy's discomfort with and refusal to
accept this possibility strongly contributed to the bright-line holding in Simmons.
80
Because juries cannot be trusted to make such determinations without error, and
because the ending of a young life means forever extinguishing an adolescent's
potential to mature and develop, a line must be drawn-however arbitrarily.81
In sum, Roper v. Simmons provides room to argue that the inherent differences
between adolescents and adults call for fundamentally different treatment within the
criminal justice system, and that bright lines are needed to counter the implicit
biases that exist against juvenile offenders. Part II imports the dual themes of
Simmons to the area ofjuvenile interrogation, demonstrating that similar biases are
found among police officers, and that young people are as vulnerable in the
interrogation room as they are in the courtroom.
M1. Importing Roper v. Simmons to Juvenile Interrogation
On September 10, 1993, having leamed of his involvement in the murder of
Shirley Crook, police arrested Christopher Simmons at his school.82 They brought
(stating that age is among the "factors relevant to the comparison of the characteristics of
defendants").
79. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 573.
80. See id. at 573-74 (discussing the dangers of individualized consideration and
concluding that, despite the imperfection of a categorical rule, "a line must be drawn"). In
response, the dissenters-Scalia in extreme terms and O'Connor in more nuanced ones-
invoked the "slippery slope" that would arise when Kennedy's reasoning is taken but a few steps
further. Scalia suggested that if juries cannot be relied upon to accurately evaluate an
adolescent offender's maturity or appropriately determine the weight to give a defendant's
youth, Kennedy's argument could be extended to support the removal of cases with other
mitigating factors, such as childhood abuse or poverty, from juries. Id. at 621 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). O'Connor, too, found fault with Kennedy's conclusion that juries cannot accurately
evaluate a youthful offender's maturity, asserting that the Court has provided no "real evidence"
to support the claim; she questioned why it would be any more difficult for juries to assess
mitigating characteristics related to youth than "any other qualitative capital sentencing factor."
Id. at 603-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81. See id. at 573-74 ("When ajuvenile offender commits a heinous crime, the State can
exact forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his life and
his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity.").
82. Id. at 557.
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him to the police station in Fenton, Missouri, and read him his Miranda
rights8 3 Simmons quickly waived his rights and agreed to answer questions.8 4
After less than two hours of custodial interrogation by police, Simmons-in
tears-not only confessed to the murder but agreed to perform a videotaped
reenactment at the crime scene. 5
One might question why someone would so readily confess to a capital
offense and, having done so, why he would agree to act it out for the police-to
give a three-dimensional, live version of an otherwise staid oral or written
confession.8 6 One can only imagine the impact that the video had on the jury
during sentencing, particularly in light of the state's argument that the
defendant's youth should be viewed as an aggravating-and not a mitigating-
factor. It raises several interrelated questions: Does a suspect's adolescence
contribute to his vulnerability and malleability during police interrogation?
Would an adult interact differently with law enforcement? Should there be
additional protections for juveniles under such circumstances?
87
83. Id.; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498 (1966) (holding that prior to
custodial interrogation, suspects must be advised they have a right to remain silent, anything
they say can be held against them in a court of law, they have a right to an attorney, and if they
cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed).
84. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 557 (2005); see also Respondent's Statement,
Brief, and Argument, supra note 68, at 12 (describing the interrogation of Simmons as having
begun "shortly" after his arrival at the police station and stating that Simmons waived his rights
before any questions were asked).
85. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 557; see also Respondent's Statement, Brief, and Argument,
supra note 68, at 12 (stating that the interrogation of Simmons lasted for approximately one
hour and forty-five minutes, after which Simmons confessed to the murder and agreed to
perform a video re-enactment); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 68, at 5 (noting Simmons's
waiver of his Miranda rights and agreement to provide a video confession); Brief for
Respondent, supra note 68, at 1-2 (stating that after nearly two hours of interrogation, during
which the "police accused [Simmons] of lying, falsely told him that [the co-defendant] had
confessed, and explained that he might face the death penalty and that it would be in his interest
to cooperate," Simmons began crying and then confessed).
86. See Jennifer L. Mnoonkin & Nancy West, Theaters of Proof" Visual Evidence and
the Law in Call Northside 777, 13 YALE J. L. & HuMAN. 329, 378-80 (2001) (asserting that
reenactments of crimes by suspects are the most powerful form of confession, as they are
confessions by demonstration, not merely by words).
87. While these are critical questions in the context of a discussion of Simmons and how it
might inform juvenile interrogation practices, their inclusion-and the summary of the
circumstances surrounding Christopher Simmons's confession-should not be read to suggest
or imply that Simmons's confession was necessarily improper or that confessions, in general,
are suspect. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, 39 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1275,
1284 (2007) (arguing that confessions are critical to the business of solving crime, and that
police deception is a "necessary component" of successful interrogations in a narrow subset of
cases).
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Using Simmons as a point of departure, this Part argues that such
questions may be answered in the affirmative, and that juvenile suspects should
be treated differently than adults in the context of interrogation. It describes the
concept and phenomenon of interviewer bias and demonstrates how it results in
inaccurate reporting; it then explores the ways in which adolescents are
particularly vulnerable to the effects of interviewer bias when questioned by
police; and finally it argues that the law should apply appropriate protections to
all young people who are questioned by law enforcement, whether they are
victims, witnesses, or suspects.
A. Interviewer Bias + The Reid Technique = Inaccurate Reporting
Given that the Simmons opinion was driven, at least in part, by a
commitment to protect juveniles from the biases inherent in U.S. culture and
law-as expressed through the sentencing decisions of capital jurors-it
follows logically that juveniles who are subjected to police interrogation should
also be protected from the deep-seated biases of law enforcement.88 In order to
demonstrate Simmons's applicability to the questioning of adolescent suspects,
it is necessary first to explain how interviewer bias combines with the Reid
88. It may also be argued that the decision was either wholly, or in part, motivated by the
concept that "death is different" or, in other words, that a categorical rule is justified only
because of the extreme nature of the penalty imposed. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 573-74
("When a juvenile offender commits a heinous crime, the State can exact forfeiture of some of
the most basic liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his life and his potential to attain a
mature understanding of his own humanity." (emphasis added)); see also Victor L. Streib,
Standing Between the Child and the Executioner: The Special Role of Defense Counsel in
Juvenile Death Penalty Cases, 31 Am. J. CRIm. L. 67, 82-85, 94-95 (2003) (characterizing
"death is different" jurisprudence as that which acknowledges-and emphasizes-the
uniqueness of the punishment of death, and addressing how the Simmons decision might fit into
this theme). One response is to suggest that the parallels between the biases of capital jurors
against juvenile offenders and those of police officers against adolescent suspects are more
closely drawn when the notion of assigning lesser culpability to minors is animated by a
commitment to ensuring that the criminal justice system is both fair and reliable. In other
words, it may be argued that Justice Kennedy drew bright lines in Simmons not merely because
"death is different," but because of an overarching commitment to advance societal norms of
fundamental fairness and human dignity. This view is supported, in part, by the majority's
reliance on international laws and covenants:
It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to
acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights [including
the rights of individual freedom and human dignity] by other nations and peoples
simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of
freedom.
Simmons, 543 U.S. at 578.
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Technique, the widely utilized interrogation strategy of police investigators, to
produce statements from suspects that are false or inaccurate.
The term interviewer bias refers to those interviewers who "hold a priori
beliefs about the occurrence of certain events and, as a result, mold the
interview to elicit statements from the interviewee that are consistent with these
prior beliefs. 89 It is marked by attempts to gather information that confirms
one's initial suspicions and to avoid all questioning that may contradict one's
already-formed suppositions.9" Developmental psychologists have, in the past
two decades, produced a number of studies that have found that the
phenomenon of interviewer bias is the hallmark of many forms of police
interrogation, that it can drive suggestive interviewing techniques, and that it
results in a significant number of reports that are ultimately proven to be
unreliable. 9'
Furthermore, psychological research confirms that the process of
92
questioning by law enforcement is typically a guilt-presumptive one.
According to the authors of the seminal text on the Reid Technique, in order for
the interrogator to be successful, "he must possess a great deal of inner
confidence in his ability to detect truth or deception, elicit confessions from the
89. Maggie Bruck, Stephen J. Ceci & Laura Melnyk, External and Internal Sources of
Variation in the Creation ofFalse Reports in Children, 9 LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENcES
289, 293 (1997).
90. Id. Researchers have identified the following biased interviewing techniques: (1) not
asking questions that allow for alternative explanations; (2) not asking questions about events
that are inconsistent with the investigator's hypothesis; (3) not challenging the authenticity of
reports that are consistent with the hypothesis; and (4) ignoring contradictory or unexplainable
evidence. Owen-Kostelnik, Reppucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 294. A fitting illustration of
the phenomenon of interviewer bias was provided at a 2004 conference on police interviewing
at which Joseph Buckley, the president of John E. Reid and Associates-the organization that
has trained thousands of law-enforcement professionals-presented the Reid Technique.
Following the presentation, a member of the audience asked Buckley if the recommended
persuasive interviewing methods did not at times cause innocent people to confess. His reply
was telling: "No, because we don't interrogate innocent people." Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra
note 26, at 36.
91. Owen-Kostelnik, Reppucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 294-97; see also Saul M.
Kassin et al., Behavioral Confirmation in the Interrogation Room: On the Dangers of
Presuming Guilt, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 187, 199-203 (2003) (concluding, as a result of a two-
phase empirical study, that the presumption of guilt that underlies police interrogation sets in
motion a process of behavioral confirmation in which erroneous prejudgments of guilt influence
the behavior of both the investigator and the suspect).
92. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 26, at 41 ("By definition, interrogation is a
guilt-presumptive process, a theory-driven social interaction led by an authority figure who
holds a strong a priori belief about the target and who measures success by the ability to extract
an admission from that target.").
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guilty, and stand behind decisions of truthfulness. '9 3 The guilt-presumptive
approach is characterized principally by the following: (1) the interviewer's
success is measured by her ability to extract an admission; (2) once she has
formed a belief about the suspect, she listens selectively and only accepts
information that is consistent with that belief, (3) she is resistant to change,
even when confronted by contradictory evidence; and (4) she unconsciously
forms "behavioral support"-also referred to as self-fulfilling prophesy or
behavioral confirmation bias-for her pre-established belief.
94
Errors ofjudgment are often made at the earliest stages of an investigation
because police officers determine whether to advance from the initial interview
to more aggressive forms of interrogation based on their evaluation of the
suspect's candor and truthfulness as well as on their identification of behaviors
that they deem guilty or deceptive.95 Unfortunately, as much research has
shown, people in general are not good lie detectors, and police officers-
particularly those trained in the Reid Technique--often see deception where it
does not exist. 96 In fact, empirical studies have shown that police do not
93. FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID, JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY & BRIAN C. JAYNE, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 78 (4th ed. 2004). The first edition of the text, by Fred E.
Inbau and John E. Reid, was published in 1962 and referenced in Miranda v. Arizona. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449 n.9 (1966) (noting that the Inbau & Reid text, along
with other police manuals, "professedly present the most enlightened and effective means
presently used to obtain statements through custodial interrogation").
94. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 26, at 41. The phenomenon of behavioral support
was first demonstrated by a 1968 field study on the effects of teachers' expectations of student
performance; similar results have also been seen in other organizational settings, such as the
military and in business. Id.; see also Kassin et al., supra note 91, at 198-201 (discussing the
results of a study on behavioral confirmation and the dangers of presuming guilt during police
interrogation).
95. See INBAU, REID, BUCKLEY & JAYNE, supra note 93, at 5-10 (describing the
characteristics and purpose of the initial interview). Proponents of the Reid Technique have
identified the following behaviors as signs of deception in suspects: (1) responding to questions
with short, monosyllabic answers; (2) refusing to discuss possible suspects or people who could
be eliminated from suspicion; (3) downplaying the significance of being a suspect and
displaying a nonchalant affect; (4) responding to questions in a circumspect, rather than a direct,
manner; (5) pausing or hesitating before answering; (6) laughing, coughing, or clearing the
throat immediately following a denial of guilt; (7) slouching or appearing distant and
disinterested; and (8) failing to make eye contact. Id. at 121-53.
96. Owen-Kostelnik, Reppucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 293; see also Kassin, supra
note 25, at 219-22 (referring to research showing that investigators are prone to make false-
positive errors during pre-interrogation interviews); Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 26, at
42-43 (describing a 2003 study in which interrogators who presumed guilt did not reevaluate
this belief when paired with innocent people who gave plausible denials; instead, they worked
harder to elicit confessions than they did either with guilty suspects or when they believed the
suspect to be innocent).
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perform better than mere chance when attempting to identify deception.
97
Research has also shown that confidence does not statistically correlate with
accuracy, meaning that police investigators who have great confidence in their
ability to detect lies are no more accurate than those who express minimal or no
confidence. 98 As a result of such findings, one may conclude that the pre-
interview or diagnostic phase of the investigation utilizes techniques and
strategies that are ultimately ineffectual, for deception cannot reliably equate
with guilt when there is no means for accurately evaluating deceptive
behaviors. In addition, as the next subpart discusses, adolescents in particular
often exhibit, quite naturally and consistent with theories of psychological and
brain development, many of the traits and behaviors claimed to be signs or
signals of deception.99 As a result, adult and especially adolescent suspects
may be found to be deceptive and worthy of interrogation when they are not.' °°
Further contributing to our understanding of the dynamic between
interviewer and interviewee, social scientists have demonstrated that police
interrogation is a process of social influence. 101 The term refers both to the
physical setting for the interrogation--one in which the suspect is isolated,
removed from familiar sights and people, and monitored by other detectives
through a one-way mirror-as well as to the procedures followed during the
questioning itself.0 2 The nine enumerated steps of the Reid Technique-which
97. Owen-Kostelnik, Reppucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 293; see also Saul M. Kassin,
Effective Screening for Truth Telling: Is it Possible? Human Judges of Truth, Deception, and
Credibility: Confident but Erroneous, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 809, 810-11 (2002) (referring to a
1991 study that found that police detectives had a 55.8% accuracy rate in lie detection tasks,
only slightly higher than the 52.8% rate of college students). Why is it so difficult for people to
judge whether someone else is lying? Studies have shown that people mistakenly focus on the
faces of others-on whether they are making eye contact and on their specific facial
expressions-rather than on the more telling cues expressed by the voice, such as changes in
pitch and rate of speech, pauses, and hesitations. Id. at 810.
98. Kassin, supra note 97, at 810 (citing Bella M. DePaulo et al., The Accuracy-
Confidence Correlation in the Detection of Deception, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV.
346 (1997)).
99. See Owen-Kostelnik, Reppucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 293 ("Given that Reid's
verbal and behavioral indicators of deception are naturally displayed by adolescents, the rate of
false-positive identifications of guilt likely increases when suspects are young."); see also infra
Part III.B (discussing the particular vulnerability of children in the interrogation context).
100. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 26, at 42 ("The presumption of guilt, which
underlies interrogation, thus [sets] into motion a process of behavioral confirmation, shaping the
interrogator's behavior, the suspect's behavior, and ultimately the judgments of neutral
observers.").
101. See id. at 42-44 (discussing specific social influence techniques that are designed to
elicit confessions).
102. Id.
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psychologists have descriptively reduced to the three general processes of
"isolation, confrontation, and minimization"-form the basis of the social
influence techniques utilized by law enforcement to elicit confessions from
suspects. 0 3 And, as demonstrated in Simmons, there is no age cohort more
vulnerable to the destructive influences of others than adolescents. 104
Thus, close analysis of the confluence of interviewer bias with the Reid
Technique, combined with other recent research by social scientists, has
demonstrated that police interrogation often is driven by the inherent biases and
presumptions of the interviewer. While investigators are trained to trust and
have confidence in their ability to detect truth or deception, studies have shown
that there is, in fact, no accurate means, technique, or strategy to identify
deception. 105  Biased and suggestive questioning can elicit unreliable
information from witnesses, and such information can result in both false
accusations and false confessions. 1
06
The next subpart takes the analysis a step further by arguing that children
and adolescents are particularly susceptible to guilt-presumptive questioning
techniques, and illustrates the ways in which juveniles-by their very nature-
103. Kassin, supra note 25, at 221. The nine steps generally track the following sequence:
(Step 1) confront the suspect with your belief that she committed the offense; (Step 2) suggest a
reason for the crime's commission that provides a "moral excuse" for having committed the
offense, placing blame on someone else, such as an accomplice or victim; (Step 3) interrupt the
suspect's denials of guilt and reiterate the moral excuse theme; (Step 4) counter the suspect's
reasons and excuses for why she could not or would not have committed the crime;
(Step 5) keep the suspect's full attention by speaking with compassion and sincerity, sitting
close to her, and maintaining eye contact; (Step 6) take note of any changes in the suspect's
nonverbal behavior, such as crying, slumping forward in the chair, or looking away from the
investigator, as such behaviors suggest that she is weighing the benefits of telling the truth;
(Step 7) present the "alternative question" or a question that seemingly provides the suspect with
a choice but actually results in an incriminating admission regardless of which option the
suspect chooses, such as "Did you plan this out or was it spontaneous?"; (Step 8) express
satisfaction with the suspect's "choice" and encourage her to provide the factual details of the
offense; and (Step 9) convert her statement into a complete oral or written confession. INBAU,
REID, BUCKLEY, & JAYNE, supra note 93, at 212-14.
104. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (describing the interrogation of
Christopher Simmons). There is evidence that the false confessions of young offenders do not
result from deception per se, but from the inherent vulnerabilities of adolescents to suggestive
questioning techniques. See Slobogin, supra note 87, at 1291 & nn.88-89 ("Research indicates
that leading questions based on the actual evidence and sincere assertions about its strength are
as likely as fraudulent tactics to cause a false confession from [youth].") Because of this
phenomenon, some call for a complete ban on interrogation of particularly vulnerable groups,
while others assert that the finding does not justify prohibiting deception in all interrogations
regardless of the suspect's age, mental capacity, etc. Id. at 1291.
105. Kassin et al., supra note 91, at 188-89.
106. Id. at 189-90.
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exhibit many of the behaviors that police investigators mistakenly associate
with guilt or deception.
B. The Vulnerability of Juvenile Suspects
The reasons Justice Kennedy enumerated in Roper v. Simmons for why
juveniles could not be classified among the worst offenders in the context of
capital punishment also serve to explain, at least in part, why children and
adolescents are particularly vulnerable in the context of interrogation. In
Simmons, Kennedy relied on neuroscience and sociological studies to conclude
the following: that juveniles' lack of maturity can result in impulsive actions
and decisions; that because of their susceptibility to outside pressures-whether
from authority figures or peers-they have less control over what goes on
around them; 0 7 and that because juveniles' characters are transitory "works-in-
progress," they should be evaluated and judged less harshly than adults.'
08
Kennedy also referred specifically to amici curiae briefs citing studies by
neurologists finding that adolescent brains are not fully developed in regions
related to reasoning, risk taking, and impulse control as well as research by
social scientists demonstrating that because of lags in psychosocial
development, juveniles are less competent than adults in the areas of
perception, decisionmaking, and judgment, making them more "suggestible" to
negative influences. °9
Of course, studies on the suggestibility of children are nothing new; since
the end of the nineteenth century, developmental psychologists have researched
107. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) ("Juveniles are more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure .... Juveniles
have less control, or less experience with control, over their own environment.").
108. Id. at 569-70. For a discussion of Kennedy's argument in Simmons that, because
juveniles under eighteen are fundamentally different from adults, the classic rationale for the
death penalty does not apply to them, see supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text. See also
Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to Protect Children
from Unknowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006 Wis. L. REv.
431,434-44 (2006) (discussing adolescent psychosocial and brain development as they relate to
the adolescent's limited capacity to waive rights).
109. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569; Brief for the Am. Med. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 9-20, Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633); Brief for Am.
Psychological Ass'n & Missouri Psychological Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent
at 9-12, Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633); see also Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability, and
the Adolescent Brain, 305 Sci. 596, 596 (2004) (discussing brain studies that have shown that
the brain is still growing and maturing during adolescence, "beginning its final push around 16
or 17," and citing neuroscientists who have asserted that brain maturation does not peak until
the early twenties).
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV 385 (2008)
and written on the topic."10 It was not until the 1980s, however, following
several highly publicized cases involving allegations of sexual abuse against
childcare providers, that both the volume and methodology of the research
changed.' 11 With greater numbers of preschool-age children testifying in court,
the numbers of studies increased and the focus shifted to exploring the causes
for variation and differences in children's suggestibility. 1 2 As a result,
researchers have taken greater care to consider and determine the relevance of
such factors as the age, intelligence, and memory of the child as well as the
style of questioning, tone, and demeanor of the interviewer. 113
Relying on the vast body of research that has consequently developed
concerning the different variables impacting children's suggestibility,
researchers have found that children and adolescents are particularly vulnerable
to the coercive questioning techniques described in the previous section.
14
110. See, e.g., Maurice H. Small, The Suggestibility of Children, 13 PEDAGOGICAL
SEMINARY 176, 177 (1896) ("[I]t seems both legitimate and sufficient, to regard 'suggestibility,'
in a provisional way, as a natural condition of mind which makes it possible for psychic activity
to be induced in a human being by means of a hint, sign or symbol; an indirect question,
proposition, association, or kindred stimulus."). In this context, children's "suggestibility" is
defined as "the tendency to be vulnerable to outside influences and pressures. It is understood
as the degree to which the encoding, storage, retrieval, and reporting of events (i.e., abilities to
observe, remember, communicate, and distinguish truth from falsehood) can be influenced by
developmental factors." Owen-Kostelnik, Repucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 291.
111. Bruck, Ceci & Melnyk, supra note 89, at 289; see also Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D.
Freidman, The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86
CORNELL L. REv. 33, 84-106 (2000) (analyzing the legal implications of their conclusions that
interview techniques influence the degree to which children can be inadvertently manipulated,
that child abuse investigations often themselves exacerbate such suggestibility, and that a false
finding of guilt is worse than an incorrect finding of innocence); Jean Montoya, Something Not
So Funny Happened on the Way to Conviction: The Pretrial Interrogation of Child Witnesses,
35 ARiz. L. REV. 927, 927-32 (1993) (describing three high-profile cases of child sexual abuse
and advocating for the videotaping of child witness interviews and the passage of fundamental
hearsay reform and other remedial legislation to ensure the integrity of the fact-finding process
and to protect children from abusive interviewing techniques); Nancy E. Walker, Forensic
Interviews of Children: The Components of Scientific Validity andLegalAdmissibility, 65 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 151 (2002) (discussing the McMartin Preschool Case, in which a
number of children claimed to have been abused by preschool workers, and State v. Michaels, a
case scrutinizing the methods of interviewing children). Walker concluded that, "[a]s [these
cases] illustrate, truth-finding involving assessments of children's retrospective reports may be
seriously compromised, if not completely obscured, when interviewing techniques are faulty."
Id. But see Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in Children's Suggestibility Research: A Critique,
84 CORNELL L. REv. 1004, 1009-11 (1999) (discussing the effect of several well-publicized
cases of false accusations of ritualistic child abuse on the development of research in the area of
child suggestibility and critiquing aspects of such research).
112. Bruck, Ceci & Melnyk, supra note 89, at 289.
113. Id.
114. See Allison D. Redlich et al., The Police Interrogation of Children andAdolescents,
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They have also determined-in general terms-that children are more likely to
provide unreliable information when questioned suggestively." 5 Extending
logically from these findings, social scientists have concluded that youth is a
"substantial risk factor" for false confessions. 16
In recent years, there have been a number of highly publicized cases
involving adolescents who have been induced to give false confessions
following aggressive interrogation by police. From New York's Central Park
jogger case, in which five juveniles-all aged fourteen to sixteen-falsely
confessed to rape and assault, to the Seattle case in which fourteen-year-old
Michael Crowe falsely confessed to the brutal murder of his younger sister,
incidents in which teenagers have wrongly confessed are not uncommon.'
l 7
in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 107, 108-11 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed.,
2004) (referencing four empirical studies on the interrogation ofjuveniles); see also supra Part
III.A (discussing the Reid Technique).
115. Owen-Kostelnik, Repucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 291.
116. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 26, at 52 (discussing cases in which juveniles
have falsely confessed and stating that juvenile suspects are highly vulnerable to false
confessions, particularly when interrogated by authority figures); Redlich et al., supra note 114,
at 109 ("A commonly noted vulnerability to false confession is youthfulness."); see also WELSH
S. WHITE, MRANDA'S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER
DiCKERSON 190-95, 201-14 (2001) (calling for prohibitions on interrogations of vulnerable
subjects, including juveniles and people with disabilities, based on findings that they are more
likely to falsely confess); Adam Liptak, Study of Wrongful Convictions Raises Questions
Beyond DNA, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007, at Al(reporting that a new study of the 200 U.S.
prisoners cleared by DNA evidence found that "[t]here were false confessions in 16 percent of
the cases, with two-thirds of those involving defendants who were juveniles, mentally retarded
or both").
117. See, e.g., People v. Wise, 752 N.Y.S.2d 837, 845-47 (2002) (reassessing the
juveniles' confessions of raping a Central Parkjogger in light of new exculpatory evidence). In
the Central Park jogger case, five teenagers ages fourteen to sixteen were convicted in 1990 of
beating and raping a woman in Central Park, but their convictions were overturned when Matias
Reyes, an adult, confessed to the crime in 2002. Id. at 840, 842. The original convictions were
supported by the confessions of all the juveniles, although DNA testing done at the time of the
original trial did not match any of them, none of the teenagers had given an accurate description
of the crime scene, and each one initially had implicated one of the others. Id. at 846-47. Over
a decade later, DNA evidence confirmed that Reyes, not the five juveniles, had raped the victim.
Id. at 842; see also Lisa M. Krzewinski, But I Didn 't Do It: Protecting the Rights ofJuveniles
During Interrogation, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 355, 357-59 (2002) (describing one case in
which two young boys falsely confessed to killing an eleven-year-old girl, and another in which
a ten-year-old boy falsely confessed to murdering his elderly neighbor after being promised that
he would be released in time to attend his brother's birthday party); David S. Tanenhaus &
Steven A. Drizin, "Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused": The Changing Legal
Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 671-77 (2002) (describing
the case of eleven-year-old Lacresha Murray whose conviction for negligent homicide of a two-
year-old girl was overturned after finding that her confession was coerced, that she did not
understand her Miranda rights or the content of her typed confession, and that she could not
have committed the crime). A six-part article series, reported in the San Diego Union-Tribune,
415
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The primary focus of the media, however, has been on the questionable
techniques utilized by the police in each case, rather than the more global
question of why such tactics are particularly effective when interrogating
juveniles.
118
The differences in the psychological and brain development of adolescents
versus adults go a long way to explaining how, in the context of police
interrogation, these common characteristics of adolescence can translate into
attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs that compromise a juvenile's ability to resist
suggestive questioning techniques. 19 For instance, because children and
adolescents have a different sense of time than adults-they live in the present
without much consideration for the long-term consequences of their actions-
studies have shown that it is not uncommon for juvenile suspects to waive their
detailed the 1998 murder of twelve-year-old Stephanie Crowe in her bedroom in Escondido,
California. Her fourteen-year-old brother, Michael, was interrogated by police after he told
them that he had walked by Stephanie's room that morning but did not see her body. Mark
Sauer & John Wilkins, Haunting Questions: The Stephanie Crowe Murder Case,
SIGNONSANDIEGO.COM, May 1999, at pt. 1 http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/reports/
crowefcrowel.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Although Michael initially denied any involvement in the crime, after many hours of
interrogation in which the police falsely claimed there was incriminating evidence against him
and promised that Michael would receive "help" instead ofjail, he falsely confessed. Id at pt. 2.
Two of Michael's teenage friends were also interrogated and falsely confessed to participating
in the crime. Id. at pt. 4. During pretrial motion hearings, Michael's confession was suppressed
after the judge found that the interrogation techniques had been coercive. Id. at pt. 6. Months
later, Stephanie's blood was found on the sweatshirt of Richard Tuite, a mentally ill, homeless
man who had been seen in the area on the day of the crime. Id. These developments led to the
eventual dismissal of murder charges against Michael and his friends. Id.
118. See, e.g., Bill Moushey, False Confessions: Coercion Often Leads to False
Confessions, PrTrSBURGH POST-GAzETTE, Aug. 31, 2006, http://www.post-gazette.
com/pg/06243/717790-84.stm (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) (citing that 42% of wrongful
convictions ofjuveniles involved false confessions and that police interrogation techniques can
be coercive but not explaining how or why) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Henry Weinstein, Panel Seeks to Curb False Confessions, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 2006, at 3
(characterizing juveniles as being among those most vulnerable to making false confessions but
not discussing why); John Wilkens, Untrue Confessions, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., Apr. 15,
2004, at El (stating only in passing that police use coercive tactics during interrogations and
that juveniles are particularly vulnerable to them).
119. It is important, however, to acknowledge that there is a distinction between the role
that brain development plays when determining an adolescent's culpability and the weight to be
given to the suggestibility or impulsivity of that adolescent during interrogation. There is not, at
this time, scientific evidence to support the claim that the ways in which adolescent brain
development make the death penalty inappropriate also produce systemic unreliability in terms
of adolescents' responses to interrogation. In other words, evidence that an adolescent's brain
may be less culpable than an adult's is not necessarily evidence that an adolescent brain is more
suggestible than an adult's. It is hoped that such inquiries will be pursued in the near future by
those in the fields of neuroscience and developmental psychology.
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right to an attorney and to falsely confess in order to be released from custody
and allowed to go home. 20  Similarly, because juveniles are particularly
susceptible to pressure from authority figures, research has found that they are
more compliant and open to suggestion, repetition, and other social influence
tactics than adults, meaning that a teenage suspect is more likely than an adult
to agree to a false or inaccurate version of an event when interrogated by a
police officer.
12 1
A related problem with the traditional investigative techniques used during
police questioning is that juveniles, as a result of their youth and because of
their very nature, often exhibit behaviors that investigators are trained to
associate with deception. 22 For instance, studies have found that although
adolescents have difficulty understanding legal terminology, they rarely ask
questions or request clarification and instead pause, hesitate, or equivocate
before answering.123 It has also been shown that teenagers, as a result of lack of
confidence and general anxiety during questioning, avoid making eye contact,
qualify their statements, respond in monosyllables, and provide nonlinear
narratives that are difficult to follow.' 24 As discussed previously, all such
characteristics should be considered as indicators of deception according to the
Reid Technique, which offers very little in the way of precautions or guidelines
for investigators who must evaluate the behaviors of adolescents. 25 Therefore,
120. See Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of] 7
Cases, 15 CRIM. JUST. 26, 28-29 (2000) (discussing a thirteen-year-old who falsely confessed
because he was "desperate to go home" and "believed he could take back his false confession
later"); Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 26, at 52 (describing a 1981 study which found that
over 90% ofjuveniles who are questioned waive their Miranda rights, motivated primarily by
the potential for release from detention).
121. Id. (citing studies from 1995, 1999, and 2003 that found that juveniles are particularly
susceptible when interrogated by police and others in positions of authority).
122. Related to this phenomenon is the law's expectation that children and adolescents
who have committed serious crimes will demonstrate appropriate levels of remorse. See Martha
Grace Duncan, "So Young and So Untender": Remorseless Children and the Expectations of
the Law, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1469, 1473 (2002) (drawing on psychology, sociology, and
literature to challenge the law's view of remorse as an emotional state that "decent" people-
regardless of age-demonstrate after committing a heinous offense, and explaining that for
developmental reasons, adolescents "may show less grief than the system demands").
123. See, e.g., Marty Beyer, What's Behind Behavior Matters: The Effects ofDisabilities,
Trauma and lmmaturity on Juvenile Intent andAbility to Assist Counsel, 58 GUILD PRAC. 112,
112 (2001) (discussing that 171/o53% ofjuveniles charged with criminal offenses have leaming
disabilities and that this often results in difficulties processing information).
124. Id.
125. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (listing behaviors that are considered signs
and signals of deception according to proponents of Reid). The 2004 edition of the text on the
Reid Technique has a short chapter that lists factors that may lead to the misinterpretation of
behaviors during the pre-interrogation interview, including two paragraphs that mention that
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it stands to reason that because police officers do not consciously recognize,
and do not control for, the fact that adolescents-by simple virtue of their
adolescence-often talk and behave in ways that are otherwise consistent with
deception, juveniles are more likely to be deceptive in the pre-interrogation
interview than adults.
126
There are several procedural aspects of traditional police interrogation that
also contribute to the particular vulnerability of juveniles. Much has been
written by both legal scholars and social scientists regarding the difficulties that
young people have understanding the language and meaning of Miranda rights,
rendering the warnings almost completely ineffectual in serving their stated
purpose-at least for juveniles. 127 In addition, empirical studies have shown
caution must be used when evaluating behaviors of children less than nine-years-old. INBAU,
REID, BUCKLEY & JAYNE, supra note 93, at 155-71. The only mention within the chapter of
juvenile subjects older than nine is a single paragraph that includes the pejorative statement:
"Ordinarily it seems to matter rather little to these subjects whether what they say is truthful or
untruthful; they tend to envision themselves as socially unaccountable for their conduct. As a
consequence, their behavior symptoms tend to be unreliable." Id. at 168.
126. Owen-Kostelnik, Repucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 293. In recent years there have
been a number of well-publicized cases in which police investigators have wrongly found
juveniles to be deceptive during the initial stages of an investigation, leading to coercive and/or
suggestive interrogations that result in false confessions. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Beth A.
Colgan, Tales from the Juvenile Confession Front: A Guide to How Standard Police
Interrogation Tactics Can Produce Coerced and False Confessions from Juvenile Suspects, in
INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT, supra note 114, at 127, 130-51 (discussing
several recent cases in which the police, driven by interviewer bias, conducted investigations
that led them wrongly to suspect that the children they interrogated were involved in the
crimes); see also supra note 117 (discussing the specifics of several recent cases in which
children wrongly confessed as a result of coercive interrogation techniques).
127. A 1981 study ofjuveniles' comprehension of Miranda rights concluded thatjuvenile
detainees aged fourteen and younger were significantly less likely to comprehend their
interrogation rights than older teens and adults. These results were complemented by a study
that found that intelligence strongly correlates with the understanding of one's legal rights, a
significant finding given that many juvenile offenders have been found to be of low intellect.
See, e.g., THOMAS GRisso, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL & PSYCHOLOGICAL
COMPETENCE 39-93, 109-60 (1981) (describing previous research assessing juveniles' ability to
understand and waive Miranda rights and reporting the results of his own study on this subject);
Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison ofAdolescents 'and
Adults' Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 333, 333-63 (2003) (finding
that adolescents performed more poorly than adults on a test used to measure competence to
stand trial); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REv. 1134, 1134-66 (1980) (describing the methodology and results of
empirical studies conducted to assess the capacity ofjuveniles and adults to knowingly waive
their Miranda rights); see also Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation ofJuveniles: An Empirical
Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 233 (2006) (finding that
juveniles aged fifteen and younger showed the "clearest and greatest disability" in exercising
their Miranda rights and their adjudicative competence and that while juveniles aged sixteen
and older appeared to function comparably with adults, "many still exhibited significant deficits
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that adolescents are particularly vulnerable to the classic interrogative
techniques of confronting the suspect with false evidence and utilizing other
forms of "trickery."'128 There has also been recent research demonstrating that
the presence of an "interested adult"-such as a parent, guardian, or friend-
which is required by some states to protect juveniles during interrogation, has
no impact on the rate at which juveniles waive their rights, as many parents
assume a passive role during questioning or, instead, strongly urge their
children to "do the right thing" and cooperate. 129
The majority holding in Roper v. Simmons, therefore, is instructive in
delineating the central reasons why juveniles are particularly vulnerable to
standard police interrogative techniques. Because adolescents are impulsive,
highly suggestible, and susceptible to the influences of authority figures, the
effects of interviewer bias, guilt-presumption, and the Reid Technique can be
especially pernicious. Further compounding the inherently problematic nature
of interrogation, police often mistake the traits and behaviors naturally
which could increase their vulnerability during interrogation"); King, supra note 108, at 458-62
(discussing the difficulties that adolescents have understanding their Miranda rights and their
resultant inability to make a knowing and intelligent decision to waive them); Redlich et al.,
supra note 114, at 112-14 (discussing contemporary empirical studies, including those
conducted by Grisso, that have investigated juveniles' comprehension of Miranda rights); infra
notes 172-76 and accompanying text (discussing the distinctions drawn between the
comprehension of "younger" versus "older" adolescents and the significance of such for the
arguments advanced in this Article).
128. See Patrick M. McMullen, Comment, Questioning the Questions: The
Impermissibility of Police Deception in Interrogations ofJuveniles, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 971,992
(proposing a per se bar on all police deception in interrogations of juveniles). But see Feld,
supra note 127, at 312-13 (stating that while deceit, trickery, and false evidence play a
"significant role" in eliciting some false confessions and that Miranda does not "significantly
restrain" the interrogation practices police use following waivers, more empirical research is
needed in this area).
129. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 26, at 52 (citing a 2001 study finding that the
presence of an "interested adult" does not lower the waiver rate for juvenile suspects); see also
Barry C. Feld, Juveniles' Waiver of Legal Rights: Confessions, Miranda, and the Right to
Counsel, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 1, at 105, 116-18 [hereinafter Feld, Juveniles' Waiver]
(discussing that the presence of a parent during interrogation may increase, rather than decrease,
the coercive pressure on a juvenile); Barry C. Feld, Juveniles' Competence to Exercise Miranda
Rights: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REv. 26, 36 (2006) [hereinafter
Feld, Juveniles' Competence] (stating that approximately twelve states have a per se rule
requiring a parent, guardian, or other interested adult at interrogation and before rights are
waived and citing examples of such). As of the end of the 2002 legislative session, eleven states
had adopted an "interested adult test," requiring that juveniles have an opportunity to consult
with a parent or other interested adult before or during an interrogation. National Center for
Juvenile Justice (NCJJ), Frequently Asked Questions, http://ncjj.servehttp.com/NCJJWebsite/
faq/legislation5.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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exhibited by adolescents for conscious signs of deception, heightening the
potential for interviewer bias and for false statements by juveniles.
The next subpart addresses the disparity that exists between the number
and quality of procedural protections offered to child witnesses and victims
during questioning and the lack of similar safeguards for juvenile suspects.
C. Young Victims and Suspects: Same Posture, Different Treatment
1. Safeguards for Some but Not Others
Extrapolating the holding and bases of Roper v. Simmons to the area of
juvenile interrogation crystallizes the ways in which juvenile suspects are
particularly vulnerable to the implicit biases and standard questioning
techniques of police investigators. The conundrum is that while the criminal
justice system has not, as of yet, acknowledged or directed its attention to what
is known about the suggestibility of juvenile suspects during questioning,
extensive reforms and procedural safeguards have been developed to reduce the
likelihood that unreliable or inaccurate information will be elicited from young
victims and witnesses of crimes. 30 Clinicians, for instance, are trained not to
use leading questions, to video or audiotape the interview, and to avoid
intimidating the child by exerting "undue influence."' 31 Law enforcement
officers often receive specialized training in child development, child
psychology, and the sociology of the family in preparation for interviewing
child victims and witnesses, and they are taught to avoid suggestive or leading
questioning and to limit the total number of interviews conducted with any one
child. 3 2 Judges have also been educated regarding the special issues that may
arise with child witnesses, including the use of alternative procedures designed
130. See Redlich et al., supra note 114, at 122-23 (arguing that while numerous reforms
and accommodations exist for the questioning of child victim/witnesses, there has been very
little done regarding the interrogation of youthful suspects); see also Feld, Juveniles' Waiver,
supra note 129, at 106 (discussing the "procedural disparity" that occurs given "the two
competing and conflicting images of young people" contained within American law and culture,
which presents them alternately as "innocent, vulnerable, fragile, and dependent children" and
as "vigorous, autonomous, responsible, almost adult-like people from whose criminal behavior
the public needs protection").
131. NANcY W. PERRY & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE CHILD WrnEss: LEGAL ISSUES
AND DILEMMAS 236-46 (1991).
132. Id. at 248-50; see also At This Prosecutor's Office, A Furry Soft Spot for Kids,
A.B.A. J., July 2007, at 18 (describing a prosecutor's office in Seattle that utilizes service dogs
to assist child victims and witnesses during the legal process-training the dogs to stand by the
children during the initial forensic interview, sit with them during trial, and even accompany
them to the witness box when they testify).
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to reduce trauma to the child, the appointment of experts to inform the court as
to how children process memories and understand language, and the
importance of instructing the jury about children's abilities and shortcomings as
witnesses. 
133
In addition, in each of the fifty states, judges have written opinions and
legislators have drafted statutes delineating the basic requirements for the
competency of child witnesses. 34 Some states hold that children below a
specified age-usually ten, twelve, or fourteen-are presumptively incompetent
to testify, unless a trial judge finds otherwise. 135 Other states require the child
to indicate that she understands the difference between the truth and a lie and to
agree to tell the truth while testifying. 36 In recent years, an increasing number
133. PERRY & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 131, at 250-52.
134. Owen-Kostelnik, Repucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 288; see PERRY &
WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 131, at 41; see also, e.g., In re J.M., 2006 OH Ct. App. 1203, 26
(reversing a sixteen-year-old juvenile's delinquency adjudication for rape and remanding to the
trial court to conduct a more complete competency hearing to determine whether the twelve-
year-old complaining witness was competent to testify).
135. PERRY& WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 131, at 41; see, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-90-
106 (2002) (providing a rebuttable presumption that children under the age of ten may not
testify, except in cases involving abuse); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-202 (2004) (creating a similar
presumption of incompetence for children under ten years of age and providing that the trial
judge may assess the competency of a child under the age often individually); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 15:469 (repealed 1988) (providing that children under the age of twelve must be
evaluated by the court); Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.060 (West 1996 & Supp. 2007) (same, also
providing an exception for victims under the age of ten); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.20
(McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2008) (creating the same rebuttable presumption of incompetence for
people under the age of nine).
136. See PERRY & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 131, at 43-45 (explaining that this
requirement is also characterized as appreciating "the duty to tell the truth" which is a corollary
of the traditional testimonial oath requirement); see also, e.g., Suggs v. State, 879 S.W.2d 428,
431-32 (Ark. 1994) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding child
witnesses competent where two boys, ages five and seven, showed the ability to distinguish
between the truth and a lie and additionally promised to tell the truth); Z.P. v. State, 651 So. 2d
213, 213-14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing and remanding the trial court's decision in a
case where the trial court failed to inquire into whether a child witness knew the difference
between a truth and a lie "in addition to whether the child ha[d] a moral sense of the duty to tell
the truth"); State v. Ransom, 864 P.2d 149, 156-57 (Idaho 1993) (holding that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony of a child victim where she testified that she
could distinguish between the truth and a lie and additionally promised to tell the truth);
Commonwealth v. Monzon, 744 N.E.2d 1131, 1135 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (discussing whether
a child witness has the "understanding sufficient to comprehend the difference between truth
and falsehood, the wickedness of the latter and the obligation and duty to tell the truth, and, in a
general way, belief that failure to perform the obligation will result in punishment" (citations
omitted)); People v. Shavers, 613 N.Y.S.2d 393,393-94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding that a
child's testimony at trial was properly admitted where the child "knew the difference between
the truth and a lie and that the word 'swear' means that 'you will always tell the truth"').
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of states have adopted some form of the Federal Rules of Evidence, under
which the judge determines the witness's competency, while the jury
determines the credibility and weight of that testimony. 137 Similarly, we have
seen the development and increasing availability of "taint hearings," in which
defense attorneys can request that an evidentiary hearing be held to determine if
the child's testimony has been improperly "tainted" by suggestive interviewing
techniques or practices." 8  Crawford v. Washington139 provided further
137. See PERRY & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 131, at 45-47 (discussing Rules 601 and 603
of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the difficulties that states have had in meaningfully
interpreting these rules); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-165 (LexisNexis 2005) (providing that
the trial judge determines the competency of potentially incompetent witnesses, including
children); MICH. R. EviD. 601 (stating that everyone is competent to testify as a witness, unless
the trial judge determines otherwise); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 601 (2007) (same); TENN.
R. EVID. 601 (same); TEx. R. EVID. 601 (same). In states where trial judges have such broad
discretion, a finding of competency can only be overruled on appeal if it can be determined that
it was unreasonable for the trial judge to find that a witness was competent. See State v. Hicks,
352 S.E.2d 424, 426 (N.C. 1989) (stating that "[a]bsent a showing that the ruling as to
competency could not have been the result of a reasoned decision, the ruling must stand on
appeal"). Additionally, "[tihe test of competency is the capacity of the proposed witness to
understand and to relate under the obligation of an oath facts" that will enable the jury to decide
a case. State v. Turner, 150 S.E.2d 406, 410 (N.C. 1966). The Turner court, in interpreting the
North Carolina Rules of Evidence, further observed that "[t]here is no age below which one is
incompetent, as a matter of law, to testify." Id.
138. Owen-Kostelnik, Repucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 288. Taint hearings in child
sexual abuse cases were first adopted in New Jersey, following the highly publicized New Jersey
case of State v. Michaels. See Julie A. Jablonski, Where Has Michaels Taken Us?: Assessing
the Future of Taint Hearings, 3 SuFFoLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADvoc. 49, 50-57 (1998) (describing
the procedure for pretrial taint hearings in New Jersey following Michaels); see also Clayton
Gillette, Comment, Appointing Special Masters to Evaluate the Suggestiveness of a Child-
Witness Interview: A Simple Solution to a Complex Problem, 49 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 499,520-37
(2005) (describing the Michaels solution for suggestive interviewing techniques and expanding
on it). But see John E.B. Myers, Taint Hearings for Child Witnesses? A Step in the Wrong
Direction, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 873, 899 (1994) (describing the procedure adopted by the
Michaels court but asserting that pretrial taint hearings compromise the prosecution of
legitimate sexual abuse cases). Although only a couple of states expressly allow for pretrial
taint hearings, several others address the issue of taint in separate pretrial hearings; these states
include New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming. See State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d
1372, 1382 (N.J. 1994) (holding that where a defendant can show that there is sufficient
evidence of unreliability of a child witness's statements, the state must conduct a pretrial taint
hearing); People v. Michael M., 618 N.Y.S.2d 171, 180 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding that in
some cases it is appropriate for the court to order a hearing to assess whether trial testimony has
been tainted); Commonwealth v. Delbridge, 855 A.2d 27, 39-40 (Pa. 2003) (holding that "taint
is a legitimate question for examination in cases involving complaints of sexual abuse made by
young children" and that the proper way to explore potential taint is in a pretrial competency
hearing); English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 146-47 (Wyo. 1999) (holding that taint should be
addressed in a pretrial competency hearing).
139. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,68-69 (2004) (finding a Sixth Amendment
violation and holding inadmissible an out-of-court, adverse statement made by petitioner's wife
THE AGE OF THE CHILD
guarantees for the reliability of children's testimony, holding that out-of-court
statements of witnesses can be admitted only if the speaker is unavailable and
the accused had a prior opportunity for cross examination.
40
In comparison, few, if any, protections have been developed to ensure that
the information elicited from juvenile suspects is reliable; in fact, prior to Roper
v. Simmons, the last major decision that protected the rights ofjuvenile suspects
was In re Gault, decided over forty years ago. 141 Gault was preceded by Haley
v. Ohio142 and Gallegos v. Colorado,143 opinions which recognized that young
people, based on their age and relative immaturity, needed explicit protections
under the law, particularly in the context of criminal interrogation. 44 Four
where the petitioner had no opportunity to confront the evidence).
140. Id. See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and
Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 511 (2005) (discussing how
Crawford v. Washington radically changed Confrontation Clause doctrine and proposing how
the doctrine should develop in response). Crawford and its progeny have rejected any policy-
based-child-hearsay exceptions to this firm rule of exclusion, with one state supreme court
recently noting that "[e]ven though there are sound public policy reasons for limiting a child
victim's exposure to a potentially traumatizing courtroom experience, we nonetheless must be
faithful to the Constitution's deep concern for the fundamental rights of the accused." Snowden
v. State, 867 A.2d 314, 329 (Md. 2005). See also Daniel E. Monnat & Paige A. Nichols, The
Kid Gloves Are Off. Child Hearsay After Crawford v. Washington, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 2006,
at 18, 18 (discussing Crawford v. Washington from the perspective of the criminal defense
attorney and offering arguments for keeping accusatory child hearsay out of court).
141. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the holding and significance ofln
re Gault for the development of the rights of juvenile suspects). Gault emphasized that "the
greatest care must be taken to assure that [a minor's] admission was voluntary." In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
142. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 598-99 (1948) (plurality opinion) (holding that a
confession obtained from a fifteen-year-old boy without the benefit of counsel and through the
utilization of coercive techniques failed to comport with due process).
143. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962) (plurality opinion) (concluding that
the totality of circumstances surrounding the confession of a fourteen-year-old, including his
age, his prolonged detention, and the failure to provide him with counsel or a friendly adult,
violated his due process rights).
144. Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 51-55; Haley, 332 U.S. at 599-601. The paternalistic language
used to describe the vulnerabilities of youth in these two cases is striking. In Haley, in which
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction based on the coerced confession of a
fifteen-year-old African-American boy, Justice Douglas wrote for the plurality:
What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature man were
involved. And when, as here, a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is before
us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender and
difficult age for a boy of any race. He cannot be judged by the more exacting
standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can
overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the period of great
instability which the crisis of adolescence produces .... He needs counsel and
support if he is not to become the victim first of fear, then of panic.
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years after Gallegos, Miranda v. Arizona was decided, and its due process
protections were extended to juveniles in Gault and several other cases decided
during this period.145 This resulted in juveniles being granted such rights as the
assistance of counsel during hearings to determine if the juvenile court should
retain or transfer jurisdiction ofajuvenile's case to adult court, 46 the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard of proof,147 and the protection from double
jeopardy, with jeopardy attaching at the adjudicatory hearing. 1
48
This expansion of juveniles' due process rights was followed in 1979 by
Fare v. Michael C. ,149 in which a sixteen-year-old murder suspect's request for
his probation officer at the onset of questioning was held not to be a per se
invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, analogous to a
request for an attorney. 50 With Michael C., the U.S. Supreme Court adopted
the "totality of the circumstances" approach for determining whether a
juvenile's confession is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.'5 ' This
Haley, 332 U.S. at 599-600.
In Gallegos, in which the U.S. Supreme Court also reversed a murder conviction based on
the coerced confession of a teenage boy, Justice Douglas again wrote for the plurality:
[A] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any
conception of what will confront him when he is made accessible only to the police.
That is to say, we deal with a person who is not equal to the police in knowledge
and understanding of the consequences of the questions and answers being
recorded and who is unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get
the benefits of his constitutional rights.
Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54.
145. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528-31 (1975) (holding that juveniles are
protected from double jeopardy and that jeopardy attaches at adjudicatory hearings); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (applying the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof
to juvenile delinquency cases); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557-63 (1966) (holding
that a juvenile is entitled to a hearing that meets the essentials of due process and fair
treatment-including assistance of counsel, access to records, and statement of reasons-before
being transferred from juvenile court to adult court for serious offenses).
146. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 558 ("[A]ssistance of counsel in the 'critically important'
determination of waiver [from juvenile to adult court] is essential to the proper administration of
juvenile proceedings.").
147. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 365 ("The same considerations that demand extreme caution
in fact finding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child.").
148. See Jones, 421 U.S. at 530 ("Thus, in terms of potential consequences, there is little to
distinguish an adjudicatory hearing such as was held in this case from a traditional criminal
prosecution.").
149. See Fare v. Michael C., 441 U.S. 707, 727-28 (1979) (holding that a sixteen-year-old
juvenile's request for his probation officer during police questioning is not the same as a request
for counsel and should not be treated as a per se assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights and
adopting the use of the "totality of the circumstances" approach).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 725-26.
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required that the factors surrounding the circumstances of the interrogation be
considered, including: the juvenile's age, experience, background and
intelligence, education, prior experience with the criminal justice system, and
whether the questioning was repeated or prolonged. Because Michael C., who
had been on juvenile court probation since age twelve and had "considerable
experience with the police," did not explicitly ask for an attorney or assert his
right to remain silent, the Court found that based on the totality of the
circumstances the sixteen-year-old had understood the nature of his actions and
that his confession, therefore, was admissible.
15 2
While Michael C. recognized that a juvenile's age is a factor to be
considered when determining whether a confession is voluntary, the Court
rejected the notion that because most juveniles do not understand their rights
when advised of them, a request for a parent or other interested adult-and not
just a request for counsel-requires that interrogation stop immediately. 5 3 In
overruling the per se approach, Michael C. also rejected the presumption that
young suspects require certain safeguards that adults do not and that they lack
the competency to waive their Miranda rights and to be interrogated without
the presence of an adult. 154 Instead, the Court paid particular heed-as it has in
152. Id. at 726-27. However, the totality of the circumstances analysis led Justice Powell,
in his dissenting opinion, to conclude that:
[Michael C.] was a young person, 16 years old at the time of his arrest and the
subsequent prolonged interrogation at the station house. Although [he] had had
prior brushes with the law, and was under supervision by a probation officer, the
taped transcript of his interrogation-as well as his testimony at the suppression
hearing-demonstrates that he was immature, emotional, and uneducated, and
therefore likely to be vulnerable to the skillful, two-on-one, repetitive style of
interrogation to which he was subjected.
Id. at 733 (Powell, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 724-25. Research has shown that juveniles are "more prone than adults" to
confuse their right to an attorney with a right-which they do not have-to a social worker or
other service provider. Redlich et al., supra note 114, at 112.
154. Michael C., 441 U.S. at 730 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall observed that:
A juvenile in these circumstances will likely turn to his parents, or another adult
responsible for his welfare, as the only means for securing legal counsel.
Moreover, a request for such adult assistance is surely inconsistent with a present
desire to speak freely. Requiring a strict verbal formula to invoke the protections of
Miranda would "protect the knowledgeable accused from stationhouse coercion
while abandoning the young person who knows no more than to ask for the...
person he trusts."
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Chaney v. Wainwright, 561 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th Cir.
1977) (Goldberg, J., dissenting)); see also Ellen Marrus, Can I Talk Now?: Why MirandaDoes
Not Offer Adolescents Adequate Protections, 79 TEMP. L. REv. 515, 518-22 (2006) (discussing
major cases that have impacted the law of juvenile interrogations, including In re Gault,
Gallegos v. Colorado, Haley v. Ohio, and Fare v. Michael C.).
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many criminal procedure decisions-to the needs of law enforcement,
emphasizing that the totality approach "refrains from imposing rigid restraints
on police."' 55
In the decades between Michael C. and Simmons, although there has been
a push for reform in the area of procedural protections for juvenile suspects,
progress has been slow and the results have been modest. Interrogations of
juveniles, for instance, are mandated to be videotaped in only a few states; 5 6 in
a majority of states, attorneys are not required to be present during the
questioning of juveniles; 57 and-for better or for worse-the presence of a
parent or guardian is required in only a small number of states and only for
juveniles of specified ages.15 8  Similarly, few laws exist that regulate the
number of hours during which a juvenile may be interrogated or that prohibit
police officers from lying to young suspects, making false promises of leniency,
or utilizing other forms of trickery or deceit during investigatory interviews.' 59
155. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979). See also Feld, Juveniles' Waiver,
supra note 129, at 112 ("The 'totality' approach gives trial judges discretion to consider a
youth's immaturity, but imposes minimal interference with police investigative work."); infra
notes 194-98 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which courts reinforce the biases
and questionable interrogation practice of law enforcement when they fail to establish clear
rules and guidelines, particularly for the interrogation ofjuveniles).
156. See Feld, supra note 127, at 246-47 (finding that despite the benefits, only a few
states require interrogations to be videotaped). Alaska, Minnesota, and Texas require all
interrogations to be videotaped, and Illinois requires recording in first degree murder cases. Id.
at 246-47 n. 124. Wisconsin requires interrogations ofjuveniles to be videotaped. Id. at 247.
157. See Brief for Juvenile Law Center, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
25-26, Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) (No. 02-1684), 2003 WL 23055034
(describing statutes that require the presence of an interested adult during interrogations of
minors). In states employing the "interested adult" test, most consider either a parent/guardian
or an attorney to be a satisfactory "interested adult," and very few specifically require an
attorney. Id. In Illinois, minors under a certain age must be represented by counsel during the
entirety of a police interrogation; in Texas, written waiver of one's Miranda rights is required
from both the child and her attorney. Id. at n. 15. In most other states with "interested adult"
requirements, representation by counsel can be waived by a parent or guardian, the juvenile may
waive it herself as long as a parent or guardian is present, or the presence of a parent or guardian
may simply replace the "required" presence of counsel. Id.
158. See Feld, supra note 127, at 226 (finding that approximately one dozen states require
the presence of either a parent or guardian or another "interested adult" presence during police
interrogations, in order to ensure a valid waiver of Miranda rights); see also supra note 129 and
accompanying text (noting that a parent's presence during interrogation of his/her child may, in
fact, increase the pressure on the juvenile to confess).
159. See Owen-Kostelnik, Repucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 298 (noting that "the
responses of lawmakers to [children as victims, witnesses, and suspects] have diverged, with
protections being institutionalized for witnesses and victims and deinstitutionalized for
suspects"). In the years since Miranda, courts have held that questionable interrogation
techniques, including the misrepresentation of evidence, are generally acceptable as long as
Miranda rights have been waived; statements elicited as a result of such techniques are held to
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Having established the disparity between the legal safeguards put in place
for young victims and the lack thereof for juvenile suspects-who are similarly
situated in regard to age and development-the next question is why this
disjunction in treatment has prevailed. The next section argues that the typical
rationales advanced to support the inconsistency in treatment between young
victims and suspects fail to hold.
2. Why the Rationales for Different Treatment Fail
The disparity between the numbers of legal reforms designed to protect the
integrity of information elicited from young victims and the relative lack of
such safeguards for juvenile suspects is one that the criminal justice system
must begin to address. The fact that juvenile victims and suspects have the
same developmental posture, causing both groups to be equally vulnerable to
suggestive or coercive questioning, must be acknowledged by law enforcement,
and the courts and legislatures must take the lead in ensuring that appropriate
safeguards are put into place for juveniles who are questioned.
While Part III.B discussed the reasons why juvenile suspects are
themselves vulnerable to standard police interrogation tactics, studies have also
shown that investigators have demonstrated bias against adolescents suspected
of criminal activity-in stark contrast to the lack of bias that they express for
children and teenagers alleged to be victims. 160 Recent research has found, for
instance, that when a juvenile suspect arrives in the interrogation room, the
detective assumes that she is competent (i.e. has an accurate memory of
relevant events and details), though is likely to lie and is, therefore, not
credible.' 6 1 On the other hand, these same investigators assume that child
victims and witnesses-based only on their preliminary identification as such-
may be incompetent (i.e. poor at remembering the relevant details of an event)
but are generally honest and, therefore, credible.162 Further compounding the
the "totality of the circumstances" standard. Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False
Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation
Techniques, 33 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 798-99 (2006). Statements by juveniles are also held
to the totality test, notwithstanding their particular susceptibility to such interrogation
techniques. See Marrus, supra note 154, at 517 (arguing that such a standard "is clearly
insufficient to protect minors").
160. See Owen-Kostelnik, Repucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 294 (discussing the biases
of police officers vis-i-vis juvenile suspects).
161. See id. (citing Kassin, supra note 25, at 215-28, and Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology
of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 221, 221-33 (1997)).
162. See id. (citing PERRY & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 131, at 52).
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negative impact on juvenile suspects of this extreme form of interviewer bias is
the recent finding that in the interrogation room, police officers do not
acknowledge the same developmental differences between adolescents and
adults that they would give credence to in other contexts. 1
63
Of course, there are understandable reasons for a police investigator to
assume that a young person who is interrogated as a suspect would have a very
different attitude than an adolescent who has been identified as a possible
witness or victim of a crime. The young suspect, knowing she is considered to
be a possible perpetrator of a crime, may be driven to lie or be deceptive by a
variety of motivations ranging from self-interest or the protection of others
(peers, adults, or family members) to fear of punishment by her parents or
reprisal from the victims or the true perpetrators-among other myriad
causes.164 The reality, however, based on research in the area of psychosocial
development, is that children who are alleged to be witnesses or victims of
crimes may also be motivated to lie during questioning by many of these very
same factors.
65
163. See id. (referring to a manuscript in preparation by the authors entitled, Police
Interrogation Practices and Perceptions of Youth Interrogative Suggestibility: A Comparison of
Multiple Police Departments).
164. See Beyer, supra note 120, at 31-32 (showing, through interviews with juvenile
offenders, that an adolescent may lie because she feels ashamed when her parents or other
family members find out about her actions, or because she simply cannot believe that she is "the
kind of person who could have committed the offense"). Additionally, some adolescents have a
sense that being punished for their roles in certain crimes just isn't fair, or think that lying will
keep them out ofjail. Id. at 32, 34. Lies in the form of false confessions may be motivated by
loyalty to peers, frustration due to being unfairly arrested and interrogated by police, or fear. Id
at 33, 35.
165. See Kay Bussey, Children's Lying and Truthfulness: Implications for Children's
Testimony, in COGNITIVE AND SOCIAL FACTORS IN EARLY DECEPTION 89, 105 (Stephen J. Ceci et
al. eds., 1992) ("The more censure children anticipate for truth telling, such as threat from an
adult, the less likely they are to tell the truth. Children may have more to fear for truth telling
than adults, especially in sexual abuse cases where they might be threatened with dire
consequences for disclosure."); John E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child SexualAbuse
Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REv. 1, 87-88 (1989) (suggesting that child victims tell their stories in
small pieces, rather than all at once, to gauge the reactions of their adult listeners). Child
victims may also recant their stories after disclosure due to "guilt and the martyred obligation to
preserve the family." Id. at 88; see Daniel B. Lord, Note, Determining Reliability Factors in
Child Hearsay Statements: Wright and Its Progeny Confront the Psychological Research, 79
IOWA L. REv. 1149, 1171-72 (1994) (summarizing research that suggests that child victims are
capable of lying to please an interviewer, to avoid punishment, and to avoid embarrassment or
awkwardness). In fact, sometimes no bright-line distinction can be drawn between a child
defendant and a child victim:
Although it is arguable whether children who commit crimes are qualitatively
similar to children who are victimized by crime, we have seen no research
comparing characteristics (e.g., intelligence, psychosocial maturity) of same-age
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The critical point here, and the one that Simmons highlights, is that the
common denominator for young victims and juvenile suspects who are
questioned is their developmental posture. Regardless of whether the
investigator believes the juvenile to be a suspect, witness, or victim, the youth
may be incapable of adult reasoning during questioning because of the long
maturation process of the adolescent brain.' 66 As a result of cognitive and
social immaturity, she may have difficulty understanding the substance,
relevance, and significance of the questions posed. 167 Because of her still-
developing sense of identity, her moral judgment may be overshadowed by a
strong sense of loyalty to peers, family, or other adults in positions of authority,
such that the veracity of her responses is compromised. 168 In short, no matter
what law enforcement believes about the young person, when the goal is the
gathering of reliable evidence, specific precautions should be taken and
safeguards implemented during the questioning of a minor.
It is worth noting that there were also naysayers after the first studies were
published in the early 1990s that questioned the reliability of children's
accounts of sexual abuse-studies that eventually led to an overhaul of the
methods commonly used to question children victims and witnesses in court
cases. 69 Some researchers and many in the law enforcement community feared
that the new findings would stymie investigators, making it difficult-if not
child victim/witnesses and child suspects. From a developmental standpoint, it is
illogical to think that child suspects/defendants differ from child victim/witnesses.
Indeed, a large percentage of child defendants were once child victims themselves.
Redlich et al., supra note 114, at 114; see also PERRY & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 131, at 55-
96 (providing a "psycholegal" perspective on the developing child). The discussion is framed in
terms of physical, mental, emotional, and social development, including such topics as cognitive
limitations, the development of perception, psychosocial needs, moral reasoning, and moral
development. PERRY & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 131, at 55-96.
166. See Beyer, supra note 120, at 27 ("[S]cientific evidence now supports the contention
that the juvenile brain is often incapable of adult reasoning because of its long maturation
process."); see also Owen-Kostelnik, Repucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 286 ("A 13-year-old
is predictably less mature than an 18-year-old, whether that 13-year-old is a victim, a witness, or
a suspect. Our assumption is that 'kids are kids' no matter the context in which they find
themselves; being suspected of committing a crime does not make a child an adult.").
167. See Beyer, supra note 120, at 27 ("Immature thought processes, difficulty with
comprehension, unstable identities, moral values that are overshadowed by a sense of loyalty, or
the effects of childhood trauma can make a young person incompetent to participate in his or her
own defense.").
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Daniel Goleman, Studies Reveal Suggestibility of Very Young As Witnesses,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1993, at Al ("Some researchers fear that the new findings will be used to
muzzle investigators, leaving them unable to get children to report sexual abuse when it has
actually occurred.").
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impossible-for them to elicit reports from children who had been abused. 1
70
Yet, as more and more child sex abuse cases were dismissed and convictions
were overturned as a result of courts holding that suggestive interviews of
children had "tainted" investigations, clinicians, prosecutors, and police
investigators were given no choice but to change and adapt their practices for
the questioning of young children.171
While it is sometimes argued that the perceived age difference between
child victims and adolescent suspects justifies more "sensitive" treatment for
the younger cohort, this argument needs to be reconsidered after Simmons.
72
One of the most critical issues addressed in the opinion is the question, "At
what age do we draw the line?" In Simmons, of course, the context was the
application of the juvenile death penalty, and the controversy was whether the
Court should hold that eighteen-rather than sixteen or seventeen-is the age
at which offenders have the maturity and demonstrate the depravity to
"warrant" a death sentence. 173 Justice Kennedy held that setting a bright line at
170. Id.
171. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing several highly publicized cases
involving allegations of sexual abuse by childcare providers that helped catalyze hearsay reform
and other remedial legislation after the improper questioning of child witnesses was exposed);
see also supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text (discussing the reforms and procedural
safeguards for child witnesses and victims that were developed in response to these cases).
172. See Owen-Kostelnik, Repucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 300 (challenging the notion
that different interrogative treatment is appropriate for child victims versus child suspects, based
on the age differential of the two groups). The corollary to this position has been that because
juvenile suspects are generally "older" adolescents-fifteen-, sixteen-, or seventeen-years-old-
they need not be interrogated any differently than adults, conceding that suspects who are
fourteen and younger may require questioning procedures that are more similar to those used
with child victims. See Allison D. Redlich & Gail S. Goodman, Taking Responsibility for an
Act Not Committed: The Influence ofAge and Suggestibility, 27 LAw& HUM. BEHAv. 141,152
(2003) (describing the results of a study showing that "minor children were more likely to
falsely take responsibility [for a misdeed] than young adults"); Jodi L. Viljoen et al., Legal
Decisions of Preadolescent and Adolescent Defendants: Predictors of Confessions, Pleas,
Communication with Attorneys, andAppeals, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 253, 253 (2005) (finding
differences between the legal decisionmaking abilities of adolescents aged fifteen to seventeen
and those fifteen and younger, with the younger cohort "more likely to confess and waive their
right to counsel and less likely to report that they would appeal their case or discuss
disagreements with their attorneys"). This rationale is implicit in opinions such as Michael C.
and Yarborough v. Alvarado, that operate from the assumption that because these juveniles are
"older," they have a better understanding of their circumstances and of how to "navigate the
complex legal system" than "younger" adolescents. Marrus, supra note 154, at 529; see also
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726-27 (1979) (arguing that Michael C. could understand the
nature of his actions because by sixteen-and-a-half he had experience with police, had been on
juvenile probation for several years, and had been held at a youth detention camp); infra note
190 and accompanying text (discussing Yarborough v. Alvarado and the common perception
that juveniles who are close to the age of majority can be expected to behave as adults).
173. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005); see supra notes 47-57 and
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eighteen for death penalty eligibility was justified because of the likelihood
that jurors-driven by their own biases and prejudiced by the horrifying
nature of the crime-could not objectively determine that factors such as
youth or immaturity were mitigating. 7 4 Similarly, appropriate safeguards
must be implemented for the interrogation of suspects who are under
eighteen, as law enforcement cannot objectively determine when a
juvenile's youth calls for different treatment. Further, as a matter of fact,
the median age of child victims has increasingly overlapped with that of
young suspects. Whereas once the majority of child victims and witnesses
who testified in court were quite young-between the ages of six and
twelve-years-old-those numbers have increased as the median age of
juvenile suspects has decreased. 175 The result is that, unlike two decades
ago, there is no longer a wide age gap separating these two groups of
potential interview subjects, tempering the argument that differences in age
justify the differences in technique when questioning child victims versus
suspects. 176
accompanying text (discussing that one of the major controversies addressed in Simmons was
the justifiability and rationality of raising the age to eighteen for qualification for the death
penalty).
174. See supra notes 59-81 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Kennedy's
reasoning in the majority holding of Simmons). But see Simmons, 543 U.S. at 602 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) ("There is no such inherent or accurate fit between an offender's chronological
age and the personal limitations which the Court believes make capital punishment excessive for
17-year-old murderers."). Justice Scalia also questioned the support for the majority's
categorical approach:
Even putting aside questions of methodology, the studies cited by the Court offer
scant support for a categorical prohibition of the death penalty for murderers under
18. At most, these studies conclude that, on average, or in most cases, persons
under 18 are unable to take moral responsibility for their actions. Not one of the
cited studies opines that all individuals under 18 are unable to appreciate the nature
of their crimes.
Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. See, e.g., Howard N. Snyder et al., U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Prevalence and
Development of Child Delinquency, Child Delinquency Bulletin Series, Mar. 2003, at I (finding
that the number of offenders younger than age thirteen entering the juvenile justice system is
increasing); Press Release, Dep't. of Justice, Nation's Younger Teens Experienced Largest
Decrease in Crime Victimizations Between 1993 and 2003 (Aug. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/jvo03pr.htm (finding that the median age of juvenile
crime victims is increasing).
176. Id.; see also Feld, supra note 127, at 233 (arguing that while younger adolescents
demonstrated the clearest disabilities with regard to exercising their Miranda rights and
displaying "adjudicative competence," older juveniles-aged sixteen and up---also showed
significant deficits that could increase their "interrogative vulnerability").
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A final critical point is that the reforms and procedural safeguards that
were put into place for child witnesses and victims were not
implemented-at least initially-out of a sense of good will or a
commitment to the rights of defendants on the part of law enforcement and
prosecutors. As illustrated, they were instituted only after courts "pushed
back" by placing prosecutions in jeopardy that relied upon the improperly
obtained testimony of child witnesses.'77 Simmons arguably compels that
this same "push back" occur when the interrogation of juvenile suspects is
demonstrated to be improper. 178  Courts and legislators must cease to
reinforce the biases exhibited by law enforcement towards juvenile suspects
and must, instead, take the lead in promoting and instituting reforms and
procedural safeguards for the interrogation of juvenile suspects that are
comparable to those that now exist for the questioning of child victims and
witnesses.1
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In sum, courts reinforce and become complicit in such phenomena as
interviewer bias and coercive interviewing techniques when they fail to
find that a suspect's age is a critical factor when determining whether
interrogation was custodial. The next Part argues that Simmons has called
into question such decisions and that its sound reasoning should prevail.
177. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing child abuse cases in which
courts dismissed or reduced charges as a result of the improperly obtained testimony of child
witnesses).
178. To clarify, my assertion is not that Simmons standing alone provides formal, doctrinal
authority for--or that the Simmons majority would necessarily endorse-higher standards for
the interrogation of juveniles; rather the argument is that the logic of the opinion-and the
evidence upon which it rests-provides a necessary, though not sufficient, doctrinal foundation.
179. The argument here is not that every protection and reform that has been implemented
to ensure the reliability of child victims' testimony should be automatically applied to the
questioning ofjuvenile suspects; rather, the point is that those in the juvenile justice system---
prosecutors, police officers, judges, etc.-must acknowledge that both groups of children are in
the same developmental posture, and thus, appropriate steps should be taken to ensure the
reliability ofjuvenile suspects' testimony with the same consideration that is given to ensuring
the proper questioning of child victims and witnesses. See infra Part V.A (offering specific
proposals for legislators and judges to consider in an effort to reframe the discussion and, thus,
impact the culture of the interrogation of juveniles); Part V.B (proposing that police
departments receive specialized training regarding adolescent development and that the general
community be educated regarding the phenomenon of"disproportionate minority impact" in an
effort to change the culture of police interrogation ofjuveniles).
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IV. Reexamining Custodial Interrogation Through the Lens of
Roper v. Simmons
A. Yarborough v. Alvarado: Privileging "Objective" Standards Pre-
Simmons
As discussed in Part II, one of the most significant aspects of Justice
Kennedy's opinion in Roper v. Simmons was his reluctance to leave the
juvenile death penalty decision in the hands ofjurors. Kennedy's refusal to do
so was premised on the likely biases that jurors would have against adolescents
accused of capital offenses as well as on the tendency for prosecutors to
explicitly characterize a juvenile's youth as aggravating rather than
mitigating.180 Consequently, in order to protect juveniles against potential
prejudices, misconceptions, and ambivalent attitudes of jurors, the Court
adopted a categorical rule that the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel
and unusual punishment prohibited the imposition of the death penalty for
crimes committed when offenders were under the age of eighteen.
81
Just four months before Kennedy heard oral argument in Roper v.
Simmons, he wrote the majority opinion in Yarborough v. Alvarado, the most
recent U.S. Supreme Court decision to address the question of whether a
juvenile's age should be considered when determining if interrogation was
custodial.18 2 Relying on past precedent-from cases in which the suspects were
adults, not juveniles-Kennedy found that seventeen-year-old Michael
180. See supra Part II.B; see also Emens, supra note 31, at 52 ("[In the majority opinion in
Simmons, Justice Kennedy] seems worried not only that juries lack the skill required to identify
the cases in which youth should be treated as mitigating, but also that they will sometimes weigh
youth in exactly the wrong way."). The Simmons decision was, of course, also undergirded by
the developmental and neurological differences between adolescents and adults. See supra Part
II.A.
181. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572-75 (2005) ("The age of 18 is the point
where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we
conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.").
182. See Yarborough v. Alvarado 541 U.S. 652, 666-67 (2004) (finding that a suspect's
age and experience with police are irrelevant to the custody inquiry). Alvarado was argued on
March 1,2004, and decided on June 1, 2004, while Simmons was argued on October 13, 2004,
and decided on March 1, 2005. Id. at 652; Simmons, 543 U.S. at 551. The matter of whether a
suspect is "in custody" is critical because pre-interrogation Miranda warnings are required only
for custodial interrogation because of the "compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966). Miranda held that "custodial interrogation"
meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444. Yet,
the decision did not provide the Court with an opportunity to apply the definition to a specific
set of facts, leaving unclear what form of custody test or analysis should be used. Id. at 439-45.
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Alvarado was not in custody when he confessed to the murder of a truck driver
after two hours of interrogation without Miranda warnings.183 Kennedy held
that custody must be determined based on an "objective" test, one that focuses
on how a "reasonable person" in the suspect's situation would perceive his
circumstances.184 He explicitly rejected a "subjective" inquiry that "turns too
much on the suspect's ... state of mind.' 85 As in Fare v. Michael C., the
Court was motivated by a commitment not to "burden" the police but to give
them "clear guidance," leaving no room for a different approach when
183. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 655-60. It is not insignificant that Alvarado was a habeas
corpus case decided under the deferential standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), requiring that the
Court determine whether the state court's holding that Alvarado was not in custody was an
"unreasonable application of clearly established law," as the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit had found. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 663. In fact, in the context of discussing the habeas
corpus standard of review, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding the interrogation of Michael Alvarado could lead "fair-minded jurists
[to] disagree over whether Alvarado was in custody." Id. at 664. Kennedy discussed the facts
that weighed against a custody finding, including that the police did not threaten or suggest that
Alvarado would be arrested; the detective focused on the crimes of Paul Soto, the man who had
shot the victim, and not Alvarado; the detective twice asked if Alvarado wanted to "take a
break"; and at the end of questioning, Alvarado went home. Id. Kennedy also enumerated the
facts that supported a custody finding, including that Alvarado was brought to the police station
for questioning by his parents-his legal guardians-and not by his own accord; the interview
lasted for two solid hours; the detective did not tell Alvarado that he was free to leave; and the
requests of Alvarado's parents to be present at the interview were denied. Id. at 665. Butsee id.
at 675 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority wrongly focused on what the police did
not do to Alvarado, rather than on what they did do). Breyer noted that the police had his
parents bring him to the station, put him with a single officer in a small room, kept his parents
out, let him know he was a suspect, and questioned him for two hours. Id.
184. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 661-62. Justice Kennedy relied on five U.S. Supreme Court
cases to support his application of the objective "reasonable person" test, rather than the
"subjective" totality of the circumstances test, to the question of whether Michael Alvarado was
in custody. 1d.; see Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) ("Once the scene is set and
the players' lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve
the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest." (citations omitted)); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323
(1994) (per curiam) (holding that the initial custody determination depends on "the objective
circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the
interrogating officers or the person being questioned"); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,
442 n.35 (1984) (finding that an objective test is preferable to a subjective one because it does
not "place upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncrasies of every
person whom they question" (citing People v. P., 233 N.E.2d 255, 260 (1967))); California v.
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (noting that what the police knew about the
suspect and the short time that had elapsed since the incident had occurred were irrelevant to the
custody inquiry); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (holding that questioning was
not custodial because there was "no indication that the questioning took place in a context
where [the suspect's] freedom to depart was restricted in any way").
185. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 669.
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questioning juveniles.1 86 Thus, the police need not give particular thought to
the interrogation of a child or adolescent; they need not evaluate the juvenile's
state of mind; and they need not consider how factors such as age and
experience might impact a juvenile's reasonable belief that she was-or was
not-free to leave.'
87
Kennedy did recognize in Alvarado that "the line between permissible
objective facts and impermissible subjective experiences can be indistinct in
some cases."'l8 8 He tried to resolve the quandary by distinguishing between
"doctrinal tests," such as the totality approach that allows for the consideration
of age and experience when courts analyze the voluntariness of a confession,
and the "objective Miranda custody inquiry" that is "designed to give clear
guidance to the police."18 9 Kennedy, thus, handily rejected the lower court's
approach, which he characterized as improperly subsuming subjective factors
(i.e. the suspect's age and experience) into an objective test, by considering
what "a reasonable 17-year-old, with no prior history of arrest or police
interviews" would perceive.' 90
186. See id. at 662 ("[A]n objective testwas preferable to a subjective test in part because it
does not 'place upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncrasies of every
person whom they question."' (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 n.35 (1984)));
id. at 668 ("[T]he Court of Appeals ignored the argument that the custody inquiry states an
objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the police, while consideration of a suspect's
individual characteristics-including his age-could be viewed as creating a subjective
inquiry."); id. at 668-69 ("We do not ask police officers to consider... contingent
psychological factors [such as prior history with law enforcement] when deciding when suspects
should be advised of their Miranda rights."); see also supra notes 149-55 and accompanying
text (discussing Fare v. Michael C. and the way in which the Court privileged the perspective of
the police).
187. See Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 662 ("[C]ustody must be determined based on how a
reasonable person in the suspect's situation would perceive his circumstances.").
188. Id. at 667.
189. Id. at 667-68. One way of interpreting the Court's ultimate message in Alvarado is
that it reveals a willingness to allow judges to consider a youth's age and experience after the
fact when evaluating the voluntariness of a confession but an unwillingness to insist that police
consider such factors before attempting to elicit the confession. See also infra Part IV.B
(discussing other cases in which courts have privileged the goals and priorities of the police
over the protection of juvenile suspects).
190. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652,667 (2004) (citing Alvarado v. Hickman, 316
F.3d 841, 854-55 (9th Cir. 2002)). But see id. at 669 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(acknowledging that while "there may be cases in which a suspect's age will be relevant to the
Miranda 'custody' injury," this is not one of them because Alvarado was-at seventeen-and-a-
half-so close to the age of majority). Justice O'Connor also asserted that it would be too
difficult for police to evaluate the significance of age, particularly when many juveniles of
Alvarado's age "can be expected to behave as adults." Id.; see also supra note 172 and
accompanying text (discussing arguments against giving juvenile suspects similar interrogative
protections as juvenile victims, based on the alleged developmental differences between "older"
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While the variances in the ultimate holdings of Roper v. Simmons
and Yarborough v. Alvarado can be attributed to the differences between
Eighth Amendment and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence or to the fact
that Alvarado was decided under the deferential habeas corpus standard,
the common thread is that each opinion addresses the question of whether
decisionmakers (sentencing phase jurors in Simmons and police
interrogators in Alvarado) have an obligation to give determinative
weight to the age and vulnerabilities of youth. In Simmons, Kennedy
concluded that because the stakes for juveniles are so high in capital
cases-with the death penalty being the "ultimate punishment"19 1-a
bright line must be drawn. 192 If the timing of the decisions had been
reversed, with Alvarado coming on the heels of Simmons, perhaps the
inconsistencies between them would have been more stark, resulting in a
different holding for Alvarado; it might have been found, for instance,
that despite the different contexts, the same factors-the unique
developmental posture of adolescents and the implicit bias of law
enforcement against juvenile suspects-are determinative, and that,
therefore, Michael Alvarado had been subjected to custodial interrogation
in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
193
The next subpart closely examines several federal and state court
opinions issued both before and after Alvarado that address whether a
juvenile was subjected to custodial interrogation. It demonstrates that the
subtext of these cases is the notion that police efficiency trumps
juveniles' due process rights, and it argues that Simmons calls for their
reexamination.
and "younger" adolescents).
191. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 593 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
192. See id. at 573-74 (majority opinion) ("For the reasons we have discussed, however, a
line must be drawn.... The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many
purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for
death eligibility ought to rest.").
193. Justice Kennedy's acknowledgement that "fair-minded jurists could disagree" over
whether a reasonable person in Alvarado's position would have felt free to leave bolsters the
view that if Simmons had been decided prior to Alvarado, the Court might have concurred that
the state court had erred in failing to consider Alvarado's youth and inexperience. In such a
circumstance, the basis for the Court of Appeals's decision--that the state court had
unreasonably applied clearly established law-would have been predicated on the Simmons
decision, and Kennedy might then have agreed, under the deferential habeas corpus standard of
review, that "the relevance ofjuvenile status in Supreme Court case law as a whole compelled
the 'extension of the principle that juvenile status is relevant' to the context of Miranda custody
determinations." Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660 (2004).
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B. Judicial Reinforcement of Police Bias: Expedience Trumps
Juveniles' Due Process Rights
Courts' deference to the needs of law enforcement, as expressed by
Justice Kennedy in Alvarado, is the common denominator of many
opinions issued in the area of criminal procedure. 94 These are cases in which
courts are speaking not to the parties, necessarily, or to the public, but to the
police. The opinions reveal that deciding judges have the perspective of law
enforcement front and center when considering the steps and analyses that
police must undertake both in the interrogation room and on the street. 195 The
specific focus of this subpart is on cases that reject the notion that age should
be a determinative factor in analyzing whether a juvenile felt free to leave
during interrogation, cases mirroring Alvarado that have now been called into
question by Simmons. In these opinions, courts typically confirm the
constitutional legitimacy of certain investigative practices (e.g., holding that
Miranda warnings are required only when interrogation is custodial) but fail to
find the factors triggering such protections (e.g., reasoning that because the
suspect was not in custody, Miranda was not required). Or courts acknowledge
that police conduct was unconstitutional but fail to impose any sanctions
(finding there was no "clear error,"'196 the error was "harmless,"'197 or it was not
an "unreasonable application of clearly established federal law," as in
A lvarado). 198
194. See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Supreme Court, Criminal Procedure and Judicial
Integrity, 40 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 133, 133-34, 158 (2003) (discussing the ways in which the
Supreme Court defers to law enforcement, providing the police with too much discretion in the
name of promoting efficiency, while intruding upon the constitutional rights of "the poor,
minorities and the politically powerless").
195. Id.; Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 666-69; see also Rayee Lumer, Comment, Yarborough v.
Alvarado: Why is the Supreme Court Pretending that "A Child is an Adult or that a Blind Man
Can See?," 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 2297, 2310 (2005) ("Keeping in mind the Court's explicit
commitment to law enforcement efforts, it is clear that its policy on protecting juveniles during
police interrogations comes with a caveat: it will extend juveniles procedural safeguards as long
as doing so does not interfere with police efforts.").
196. The "clear error" standard applies when findings are based upon a substantial error in
proceedings or misapplication of law; when unsupported by substantial evidence; or when
contrary to clear weight of evidence or induced by erroneous view of the law. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 131 (5th ed. 1983).
197. The "harmless error" test assesses whether an error at trial "had substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," and examines the actual
prejudicial effect of error on a verdict. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141,145-46 (1998) (per
curiam) (reversing grant of habeas corpus relief and holding that the harmless error standard
must be applied) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).
198. When a case has been adjudicated by a state court and relief has been denied, a federal
court may not find otherwise unless, as per 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) (2000), the state court's
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It is useful to examine several of the representative cases that fit into these
categories-In re J.H., 199 People v. Howard,200 and State v. Eggers20 -as they
have bearing on the treatment of juveniles during interrogation and, thereby,
illustrate courts' unwillingness to consider a suspect's youth as a determinative
factor when evaluating whether the police have overstepped their bounds. In re
J.H. is a recent decision that is representative of federal appellate opinions
confirming the constitutional legitimacy of requiring Miranda warnings prior to
custodial interrogation but ultimately holding-in tension with the spirit of
Simmons-that the juvenile's age is not a critical factor in the analysis.2 °2 The
case involved a twelve-year-old who was interrogated by a police officer at his
school and confessed to a sexual offense involving his three-year-old sister.
203
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial of the
juvenile's motion to suppress his statement on the ground that he was not in
custody for Miranda purposes.204 Relying on Alvarado, the court applied an
"objective" test that considered the totality of the circumstances from the
viewpoint of a "reasonable person., 20 5 Although the police investigator did not
decision was an "unreasonable application of clearly established federal law." Brown v. Payton,
544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (holding that the jury instruction was not an unreasonable application
of precedent). This standard is met when the state court "applies a rule that contradicts the
governing law set forth in our cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially
indistinguishable from a decision of this Court but reaches a different result." Id. (citation
omitted). Thus, applying precedent to the facts at hand in "an objectively unreasonable manner"
will result in a federal court overturning the decision. Id.
199. In re J.H., 928 A.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
200. People v. Howard, 92 P.3d 445 (Colo. 2004).
201. State v. Eggers, 160 P.3d 1230 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
202. See, e.g., United States v. N.J.Y., 180 Fed. Appx. 1, 3-4 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding
that, under the totality of the circumstances, a fourteen-year-old was not in custody for Miranda
purposes because the questioning took place close to his house, he was told that he could leave,
and agents did not make specific accusations); United States v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1246-
48 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a thirteen-year-old boy was not in custody when questioned in
his home by an FBI agent and criminal investigator because a reasonable person in his position
would not think he was under arrest); United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 831 (1 st Cir. 1994)
(finding that a fourteen-year-old was not in custody when he made incriminating statements
based on the circumstances).
203. In reJ.H., 928 A.2d at 645.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 648. The trial court judge did consider the juvenile's age when examining the
totality of the circumstances but concluded that the interview was "as non-custodial as one could
imagine of an interview of a juvenile in school by a law enforcement officer." Id. at 650. The
D.C. Circuit did not explicitly consider the juvenile's age, stating that age does not "require"
suppression and citing Alvarado to support its assertion that "[t]he Supreme Court has not
definitively ruled on whether a suspect's youth is part of the objective Miranda custody
analysis." Id.
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tell J.H. that he was free to go or that he was free not to answer questions when
they met across the hall from the principal's office, the court held that the
absence of such advice "does not, by itself, control the outcome of this case."
206
The circuit court affirmed the district court's refusal to impose such a per se
rule for the questioning of juveniles.2 °7
The second case, People v. Howard, echoes the reasoning and justification
found in state appellate court opinions that fail to find the factors necessary to
trigger protections-such as Miranda warnings-that are available to juveniles
during interrogation.20 8 In Howard, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the
lower court's decision to suppress a seventeen-year-old's admission to sexual
abuse made to police who had spoken with Howard in the driveway area of his
home.20 9 The court found that when evaluating whether the interrogation was
custodial under the totality of the circumstances test, though the juvenile's age
may be considered, "it will not constitute the determinative factor in a finding
of custody., 210 It also held that, in concluding that a reasonable person in
Howard's position would not have felt free to leave, the lower court improperly
focused on the "subjective intent" of the officers-who had deliberately
separated the juvenile from his parents-rather than on the fact that the
206. Id.
207. Id. at 649. In particular, the D.C. Circuit observed that:
[T]o rule that this particular interview was custodial because [the investigator] did
not advise [J.] that he was free not to answer questions and he was free to leave
would, in effect, on these facts, impose what would amount to an across-the-board
prophylactic rule that any time the police wanted to speak to a child in school, no
matter how non-coercive the circumstances otherwise were[,] ... the police
would... always have to do that.
Id.
208. See, e.g., State v. Tolliver, No. COA05-1687, 2007 WL 91654, at *7 (N.C. Ct. App.
Jan. 16, 2007) (unpublished table decision) (finding that the juvenile was not in custody where
the police picked him up, took him to a different location, and questioned him regarding a
crime, despite the arguable "coercive nature" of the questioning); In re J.B., No. CA2004-09-
226,2005 WL 3610482, at *8-10 (Ohio App. 12 Dist. Dec. 30,2005) (finding that, though the
thirteen-year-old defendant and siblings were taken to the police station in the early hours of the
morning when no other detectives were present, the defendant was not "in custody"); In re
M.B., No. 22537, 2005 WL 2995113, slip op. at 3 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. Nov. 9, 2005) (finding
that seventeen-year-old juvenile was not "in custody" in light of the totality of the
circumstances); CSC v. State, 118 P.3d 970, 977-78 (Wyo. 2005) (finding that the police were
not required to consider a sixteen-year-old suspect's age before beginning questioning, and that
in light of totality of the circumstances, the defendant was not in custody).
209. People v. Howard, 92 P.3d, 445,447 (Colo. 2004).
210. Id. at 450 (citation omitted).
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"general atmosphere and tone of the interview... did not evince any attempt
by police to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner."'l
The third case, State v. Eggers, is an example of a decision in which the
court found that the police had acted unconstitutionally-in this instance by
failing to give Miranda warnings to a sixteen-year-old murder suspect prior to
custodial interrogation-but deemed the error to be "harmless," affirming the
conviction.212 In its analysis of whether Zachary Eggers was in custody, the
Arizona Court of Appeals considered the usual factors that bear on the issue of
custody, including indicia of arrest, the place, length, and form of the
interrogation, and whether the accused knew that he was a suspect.213 The
court further noted-in contradiction with the spirit of Simmons-that the
child's age, maturity and experience with law enforcement, and the presence of
a parent or other supportive adult were merely "additional elements that bear
upon a chiid's percepijons nd vtilnerabilty. 2 14 The court concluded that
because the teenager was in the presence of police for several hours, either in a
patrol vehicle or at the police substation, a "reasonable person" would have felt
as though his "freedom of movement was significantly restricted, tantamount to
formal arrest., 21 5 Ultimately, however, the court found that the admission of
the juvenile's confession was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," as it did
not "contribute to or affect the verdict."
21 6
Focused analysis of Alvarado and the decisions discussed above should
not be interpreted to suggest, however, that there are no bright spots-cases
consonant with Simmons in which courts have recognized that age is a strong
211. Id. at 450-52 (citation omitted). The trial court emphasized the unfair nature of this
"ploy" in its decision to suppress thejuvenile's statements, while the appellate court concluded
that the motives of the officers should not be considered when applying the "objective"
reasonable person test. Id. at 450-51.
212. See State v. Eggers, 160 P.3d 1230, 1247 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) ("Thus, even without
[the confessions] that should have been excluded, the verdicts would not have been different.
Upon review of the entire record, we conclude, as a matter of law, that the introduction of the
[confessions] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."); see also, e.g., United States. v. Doe,
170 F.3d 1162, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that failure to notify the juvenile's parents of
his Miranda rights as required by statute was harmless error); Tankleffv. Senkowski, 135 F.3d
235, 245 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding the admission of incriminating pre-Miranda statements by the
seventeen-year-old murder suspect harmless error because a subsequent "Mirandized"
confession was admissible); United States v. Indian Boy X, 565 F.2d 585, 592-93 (9th Cir.
1975) (finding that the juvenile's confession was properly admitted, because police and FBI
agents committed harmless error by not taking the juvenile to magistrate "forthwith," as required
by statute).
213. Eggers, 160 P.3d at 1239.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1241.
216. Id. at 1246-47.
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factor weighing against the voluntariness ofajuvenile's confession or, perhaps
even more significantly, that age is a critical factor supporting a finding that the
interrogation was custodial. Such opinions do exist, and while most were
decided by state courts, 21 7 there are a few federal court cases-decided prior to
Alvarado-that have also recognized that age is a critical factor in the analysis
of whether the juvenile was interrogated while in custody.218
One notable federal appellate decision is that of A.M v. Butler 19 in which
the court expunged a juvenile's delinquency finding after holding that the
eleven-year-old murder suspect would not have reasonably believed he was free
to leave during police interrogation.220 The court found that the child was in
custody based on his young age, his lack of prior experience with the criminal
justice system, the fact that he was questioned for two hours without a parent or
lawyer, and because he was dependent on the police detectives to drive him
217. See, e.g., In re Andre M., 88 P.3d 552, 555 (Ariz. 2004) (reversing juvenile
adjudications for possessing a deadly weapon on school grounds and possessing a firearm as a
minor after holding that the deliberate exclusion of a sixteen-year-old juvenile's mother from
interrogation created a presumption of involuntariness); In re Ronald C., 486 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576
(N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (reversing the delinquency order and dismissing the petition for criminal
mischief and possession of burglar's tools on grounds that the thirteen-year-old juvenile was
unaccompanied by parent or counsel during questioning, and because the police "should have
known" that placing screwdrivers in front of him would elicit incriminating response); In re
W.R., 634 S.E.2d 923, 926 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the court must determine
whether a juvenile was in custody considering all the facts and circumstances from the
perspective of a reasonable person in the juvenile's position, and, thus, vacating delinquency
adjudication after finding that the fourteen-year-old suspect's statement was made during
custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings); In re K.Q.M., 873 A.2d 752, 757 (Pa. 2005)
(vacating delinquency orders after holding that the sixteen-year-old suspect's confession was
inadmissible because he wasn't advised of his Miranda rights based on the totality of the
circumstances); In re Jerrell C.J., 699 N.W.2d 110, 123 (Wisc. 2005) (holding that the
confession of a fourteen-year-old charged with armed robbery was involuntary based on a
totality of the circumstances analysis, specifically citing his young age, limited education and
low average intelligence, and limited experience with law enforcement as important factors).
The court also rejected a request for a per se rule excluding custodial admissions from juveniles
under sixteen who have been denied the opportunity to consult with a parent or other interested
adult. Id.
218. See, e.g., Bridges v. Chambers, 447 F.3d 994,998 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006) (suggesting that
the common police tactic of intentionally separating a seventeen-year-old juvenile suspect from
his parents during questioning, despite the suspect's requests to the contrary, may be invalidated
in the future in light of Roper v. Simmons); In re I.J., 906 A.2d 249, 264 (D.C. 2005) (holding
that the officer should have known that his question, "What happened?" was reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response and, thus, that custodial interrogation without Miranda
warnings took place when a sixteen-year-old was questioned at the youth detention center where
he resided).
219. A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2004).
220. Id.
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home.221 This case is particularly significant, as it found that age is an
"important factor" in the objective inquiry into whether the suspect felt at
liberty to end interrogation and leave.222 In fact, A.M v. Butler explicitly stated
that there was "no valid reason" why an analysis that considers the juvenile
suspect's age-such as the totality test that is used to determine whether a
confession was voluntary-should not "apply equally to an 'in custody'
determination. ,
223
Alvarado and the other cases discussed in Part III demonstrate that when
courts fail to establish bright-line rules for police officers during the
interrogation of juveniles, i.e. when they fail to explicitly consider the
defendant's youth as a critical factor in the analysis of whether the questioning
was custodial, they reinforce police prejudices and stereotyped notions about
adolescent suspects, thereby privileging the objectives of the cop on the beat-
or +-I-.-- detectiv ;M 44,h e ,.elgt-g n rnnm---.-,r the rights of the juvenile
suspect. In this way, courts become complicit in the types of interviewer bias
that lead to inaccurate reporting by juveniles, just as they are complicit when
affirming sentencing decisions by jurors motivated by implicit bias and
prejudice against a juvenile offender. Roper v. Simmons, therefore, supports
that bright lines be drawn by both the courts and the legislature to counter the
ingrained biases held by the police against juvenile suspects. 224  Part V
proposes specific rules and reforms that provide the bright lines needed to
temper the biases held by police officers against juvenile suspects during
interrogation.
221. Id. at 797-98. Separate from the custody finding, the court found that A.M.'s
statement was involuntary even though Miranda rights had been given, because "[t]here is no
reason to believe that this 11-year-old could understand the inherently abstract concepts of the
[Miranda] rights and what it means to waive them." Id. at 801 n. 11.
222. See id at 797 ("Every jurisdiction that has squarely addressed the issue, moreover, has
ruled that juvenile status is relevant, either as a factor under the totality of circumstances test or
by modifying the usual reasonable person standard.").
223. Id.
224. While some may perceive a tension between promoting a bright-line rule for the
questioning of juveniles and advocating for "seeing ... the three-dimensional reality" of
children, the two impulses are not inconsistent. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text
(characterizing bias-whether by jurors toward juvenile offenders or by police officers toward
juvenile suspects-as seeing the type or category of the person rather than the "three-
dimensional reality"). The argument here is that in the complex and highly nuanced context of
the interrogation of children, where contextualized standards cannot provide adequate
protections, categorical rules are necessary. See supra Part III (discussing the ways in which
juveniles are particularly vulnerable to the effects of interviewer bias during interrogation,
thereby necessitating that per se rules and policies be implemented for the questioning of
adolescent suspects).
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V Changing the Culture of Police Interrogation of Juveniles
A. Top Down: Proposals for Legislators and Judges
In the context of capital punishment, it is relatively straightforward for a
court or legislature to draw a bright line-as in Simmons, it can be done via a
decision or statute defining the parameters of the state's ability to execute, with
limits typically based on the offender's age or IQ or on the type of offense.2 25
In the context ofjuvenile interrogation, the establishment of per se rules is not
nearly as straightforward, though it is clear that comprehensive reform of the
culture of juvenile interrogation must also begin in our courts and
legislatures. 226 With that in mind, the following proposals are intended-at
least initially-to apply only to those cases in which juveniles' statements are
sought to be introduced during prosecutions in criminal court, not to matters in
juvenile delinquency court. 7  A graduated implementation of such reforms is
recommended, given the likely logistical complications and inevitable
resistance that will ensue. Allowing for less rigorous protections ofjuveniles in
the context of delinquency adjudications is only justified, however, if the
225. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
226. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 26, at 59. The authors observed:
In light of the recent high-profile wrongful convictions involving false confessions,
as well as advances in psychological research in this area, the time is ripe for a true
collaborative effort among law-enforcement professionals, district attorneys,
defense lawyers, judges, social scientists, and policymakers to evaluate the methods
of interrogation that are commonly deployed.
Id.
227. Of course, it is not always known at the outset whether a young suspect will ultimately
be prosecuted in delinquency or criminal court, for if automatic transfer and statutory exclusion
provisions do not apply, the discretion to transfer a juvenile's case to adult court often lies with
the prosecutor or judge-in some cases requiring that an evidentiary hearing be conducted to
determine if the protection of the public and the needs of the juvenile would be best served by
transfer. See, e.g., CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, THE CONSEQUENCES AREN'T MINOR: THE
IMPACT OF TRYING YOUTH AS ADULTS AND STRATEGIES FOR REFORM 5, 10 (2007), available at
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/Downloads/NEWS/National_Reportconsequences.pdf
(last visited Feb. 12, 2008) (finding that in approximately fifteen states, the discretion and
authority to send youth to adult court has been delegated to prosecutors, while in most other
states, the juvenile court judge has the authority to waive juvenile court jurisdiction and transfer
the case to criminal court) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In most
investigations of particularly serious or violent offenses, however, it is known by law
enforcement that the perpetrator-whether ajuvenile or an adult-will ultimately be charged in
criminal court, thereby placing the police on notice that upon questioning a minor suspect,
certain safeguards must be followed.
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dispositional scheme is significantly less punitive and more rehabilitative for
juveniles in delinquency court than in adult criminal court.228
The first step, effectively advocated for by Professor Steven Drizin, is the
routine videotaping of interrogations.229 Such a policy would serve to deter
police from the most egregious interrogation tactics; it would discourage
frivolous claims of police coercion; and it would provide an objective and
accurate record of the process.230 Mandatory videotaping is a practice that is
slowly gaining ground across the United States, despite strong initial resistance
by police and prosecutors.23' In fact, in jurisdictions where it has been
228. The concern here is directed towards those jurisdictions that have instituted
particularly punitive juvenile court dispositions as well as those in which juvenile court
adjudications are used to enhance criminal court sentences. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas
Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L.
y.3 2 )d , ht .inhot n r forndm tnror
U.v 793, sts a"adjudicative competence" be applied to young offenders in juvenile court than in criminal
court).
229. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons of History: The
Needfor Mandatory Recording of Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess the Reliability and
Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 619, 646 (2004) (providing a historical
overview of the practice of recording police interrogations and advocating for mandatory
recording); Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping
of Interrogations is the Solution to Illinois'Problem of False Confessions, 32 LoY. U. CHI. L.J.
337, 341 (2001) (advocating for mandatory videotaping policy in Illinois); Lawrence Schlam,
Police Interrogation of Children and State Constitutions: Why Not Videotape the MTV
Generation?, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 901, 925-35 (1995) (discussing existing provisions requiring
videotaped interrogations and advocating for videotaping the interrogation ofjuveniles); Wayne
T. Westling, Something is Rotten in the Interrogation Room: Let's Try Video Oversight, 34 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 537, 554 (2001) (advocating the videotaping of all interrogations generally);
see also Owen-Kostelnik, Repucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 300 (arguing that reforms such as
mandatory videotaping are urgently needed for interrogations ofjuveniles, as research indicates
that they are at "increased risk of providing false confessions"). But see Feld, Juveniles'
Competence, supra note 129, at 92-98 (discussing the policy merits as well as the drawbacks of
requiring interrogations to be recorded).
230. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 26, at 60-61 (arguing that a videotaping policy
would have all these advantages, thereby creating a "more effective safety net").
231. See id. (discussing that the practice of videotaping interrogations is gaining ground,
despite initial resistance from law enforcement); see also In re Jerrell C.J., 699 N.W.2d 110,
123 (requiring all custodial interrogations of juveniles to be electronically recorded "where
feasible" and "without exception" when the questioning occurs at a place of detention); Nadia
Soree, When the Innocent Speak. False Confessions, Constitutional Safeguards, and the Role
of Expert Testimony, 32 Am. J. CRIM. L. 191, 258-60 (2005) (describing the creation of the new
Illinois statute requiring interrogations to be videotaped and the initial concerns that videotaping
interrogations will lead to fewer confessions and prejudice juries against police officers);
Westling, supra note 229, at 552 (hypothesizing as to why there is "foot-dragging" about
videotaping police interrogations and postulating that it is possibly because police do not want
to learn new technology and because they wish to preserve the "incommunicado" nature of the
current system); Matthew D. Thurlow, Comment, Lights, Camera, Action: Video Cameras as
Tools ofJustice, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 771,797-801 (2005) (citing cost, the
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implemented, law enforcement has consistently reported that it has had no
negative effects on the investigative process.232 While questions remain
regarding the most appropriate format and camera perspective to use during the
recording of interrogation, clinicians, police, prosecutors, and juvenile
defenders can cooperatively develop and recommend best practices to ensure
that appropriate procedures are followed.233
Secondly, courts must be open and receptive to proposals to apply a per se
analysis to central aspects of juvenile interrogation. This will serve to give
clear guidance to police in the field while also providing appropriate due
process protections for juvenile suspects. The rationale is straightforward: If
we do not want to impose on law enforcement the responsibility to make
subjective assessments of juvenile suspects-and rather than presuming, for
example, that a suspect is not in custody as long as she is given the opportunity
to take breaks and is allowed to go home-per se rules are warranted. The
most critical step is to mandate through legislation that Miranda warnings be
given to juveniles who are questioned-whether in custody or not-and that a
simplified version of the rights form be used for juvenile suspects.234 In
belief that suspects will not be willing to talk when videotaped, and officers' dislike of being
monitored as reasons for police to resist videotape requirements).
232. See THOMAS P. SULLIVAN & Nw. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS, POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS 22-23 (2004)
(surveying more than 200 U.S. law enforcement agencies that videotape custodial interrogations
and finding that videotaping does not inhibit suspects from talking with police or confessing and
explaining the ways that videotaping interrogations can actually save money); see also Kassin &
Gudjonsson, supra note 26, at 61 (citing a National Institute of Justice study that found that the
vast majority of police and sheriffs' departments in the United States that voluntarily videotaped
interrogations found the practice useful); Thurlow, supra note 23 1, at 810-13 (noting that most
police departments found that videotaping was actually beneficial because it did not discourage
suspects from confessing, was not too expensive, and provided officers with tools that they
could use to evaluate their interviewing skills).
233. See Elizabeth C. Wiggins & Shannon R. Wheatman, So What's a Concerned
Psychologist To Do? in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT, supra note 114, at
265, 266 (calling for a scientific review paper, endorsed and delineated by leading experts, that
defines the critical psychological issues inherent in current police interrogation techniques and
offers recommendations for conducting interrogations and guiding additional research); see also
G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Criminal Confessions on Videotape: Does Camera Perspective Bias
Their Perceived Veracity?, 7 CURRENT RES. IN SOC. PSYCHOL. 7 (2001), available at
http://www.uiowa.edu/-grpproc/crisp/crisp.7.1.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2008) (presenting
research on the impact of camera point of view on judgments of coercion and voluntariness) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 26, at 61
(arguing that "the camera adopt a neutral 'equal focus' perspective that shows both the accused
and his or her interrogators"); Owen-Kostelnik, Repucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 301 (citing
the Lassiter study); Tom Sigfried, Camera Can Sway Jury's View of Video Confession, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Feb. 17, 2003, at 3C (discussing Lassiter's study).
234. See, e.g., Hillary B. Farber, The Role of the Parent/Guardian in Juvenile Custodial
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addition, an attorney should be provided for juveniles prior to questioning or
interrogation to advise the child and her parent or guardian.235 Time limits
should be placed on the interrogation of juveniles to prevent repeated and/or
protracted, and potentially coercive, questioning sessions,236 and utilizing
trickery or false promises of assistance or leniency should be banned during
police questioning of juveniles.237
Lastly, juvenile defenders must take the lead in-and courts must be
receptive to-the utilization of experts to testify regarding adolescent
psychological and brain development when the admissibility of a confession
hinges on what the juvenile, herself, perceived during the interrogation.238
Clinical and research psychologists, neuroscientists, and other experts can
provide invaluable assistance as judges and juries grapple with such critical
questions as, "Did the juvenile feel free to leave? Did she understand
Interrogations: Friend or Foe?, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1277, 1308(2004) (proposing the use of
a simplified juvenile rights form, designed for differing levels of maturity and IQ, that would
enhance the comprehension of juveniles).
235. See, e.g., id. at 1280 (advocating that juveniles have a nonwaiveable right to counsel
before waiving Miranda rights); King, supra note 108, at 475-76 (arguing for a per se rule that
children must be provided with counsel prior to interrogation); Kimberly Larson, Improving the
"Kangaroo Courts ": A Proposal for Reform in Evaluating Juveniles' Waiver of Miranda, 48
VILL. L. REV. 629, 660-61 (2003) (advocating that all juveniles under the age of sixteen be
required to consult with counsel); Marrus, supra note 154, at 527 ("To ensure equality between
adults and minors in this context, I take the position that no juvenile can be interrogated unless
an attorney is present."); Schlam, supra note 229, at 925 (citing the Institute of Judicial
Administration and the American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Standards Project as
suggesting that juveniles should have mandatory and nonwaiveable access to an attorney during
"all stages of the proceeding").
236. See, e.g., Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 26, at 60 (arguing that because excessive
time in custody poses a risk to innocent suspects, policy discussions should begin with a
proposal to impose time limits, or at least flexible guidelines, for detention and interrogation, as
well as breaks from questioning for rest and meals).
237. See, e.g., id. at 60 (citing controlled studies that have shown that the presentation of
false evidence "substantially increases false confessions"); McMullen, supra note 128, at 1005
(proposing a per se ban on all police deception during the questioning ofjuveniles).
238. See, e.g., Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 26, at 58 (arguing for the increased
inclusion of expert testimony to inform judges and juries about police interrogations, false
confessions, and personal and situational risk factors as well as to render opinions about the
veracity of particular confessions); Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary
Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. GIN. L. REv. 89, 113
(2002) (suggesting that an expert could have helped educate the court in a case where a twelve-
year-old boy with limited communication skills confessed to stealing a car and was found
competent during the suppression hearing); see also Leonard Post, The False Confessions of
Juveniles, 47 BROWARD DAiLY Bus. REv., Jan. 17, 2006, at 1 (quoting Simmie Baer of the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers' juvenile justice committee as advocating for
the admission of expert testimony regarding juvenile confessions).
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Miranda? Did she appreciate the significance of giving a statement? 239 As
discussed in Part III.C, when drafting specific proposals, legislators, police
departments, and their policy advisors should use the reforms and procedural
safeguards that have been developed to protect the integrity of information
elicited from young victims and witnesses as their guides.24°
While implementing per se rules and policies to ensure that the due
process rights of juveniles are protected during police questioning may seem
radical, given that the context is the interrogative treatment of children and
teenagers-with all its inherent risks and pitfalls-it is the very least that must
be done. As illustrated in the previous sections, bright lines are desperately
needed in this area, and those at the top--judges and lawmakers-must take the
first critical steps, confident that the other actors in the criminal and juvenile
justice systems will follow.
B. Bottom Up: Educating Police Departments and the Community
In conjunction with the implementation of legal reforms and safeguards
for the interrogation of children, law enforcement officers must be educated
regarding the stages of adolescent development and the implications of such for
the questioning of juveniles.241 We have much to learn from social scientists
who have made it clear that in order to determine a young person's intent or
competency, a thorough assessment of whether their capacity is limited by a
variety of disabilities, including trauma and developmental delay, is
242necessary. Just as police investigators receive specialized training in this
area in preparation for the appropriate interviewing of child victims and
witnesses, comparable training must be required prior to interrogating juvenile
suspects. 4 3
239. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 26, at 58 (noting that clinical and research
psychologists in Great Britain have had a "substantial impact in recent years on law, police
practice, trial verdicts, and appellate decisions" through their research and expert testimony).
240. See supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text (discussing the reforms and
safeguards implemented for the questioning of child victims and witnesses by police).
241. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confession in
the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REv. 891, 1004-05 (2004) (advocating for training police
officers, prosecutors, and judges in proper techniques of interrogating juveniles and the mentally
handicapped); Owen-Kostelnik, Repucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 300 (discussing the
importance of training police in areas of child development to prepare them for the interrogation
of juvenile suspects).
242. See Beyer, supra note 123, at 113 (discussing the importance of assessing the effects
of disabilities on juvenile intent and the ability to assist counsel).
243. See supra Part III.C (discussing the disparity between the numerous reforms and
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In addition, it is essential that those in the juvenile justice field take
significant steps to promote community awareness of the phenomenon of
disproportionate minority representation within the juvenile justice system and
what it means for children of color.24 Studies have recently demonstrated that
most teenagers sent to death row are poor, black, and likely to have been
convicted of killing whites. 245 Similar statistics exist for the demographics of
children and adolescents in the juvenile court system.246 Awareness that our
accommodations that exist for the questioning of child victims compared with the lack of such
safeguards for the interrogation of juvenile suspects); Krzewinski, supra note 117, at 384
(suggesting that juvenile interrogators should look to the protocols for questioning child victims
in light of the high profile false confession cases involving juveniles); see also Redlich et al.,
supra note 114, at 122-23 (finding that the developmental similarities between child suspects
and victims and the "mass of related research findings on the forensic interviewing of child
',;-t,,-,itPee" c11ggiPt that interrngation techniques used with adults are not suitable for
children).
244. See, e.g., BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME 1 (2000), available at
http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/justiceforsome/jfs.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2008)
(discussing disproportionate representation of minority youth in the justice system) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). The study found that the phenomenon of
disproportionate minority contact is the product of
actions that occur at earlier points in the juvenile justice system, such as the
decision to make the initial arrest, the decision to hold a youth in detention pending
investigation, the decision to refer a case to juvenile court, the prosecutor's
decision to petition a case, and the judicial decision and subsequent sanction.
Id.; see also Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV 374, 402-17 (2007)
(stating that "African American juveniles are overrepresented in juvenile justice institutions as
compared to their levels in the general population"); Kasey Corbit, Note, Inadequate and
Inappropriate Mental Health Treatment and Minority Overrepresentation in the Juvenile
Justice System, 3 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 75,77 (2005) (stating that "minority youth are
only one-third of the U.S. adolescent population, yet they account for two-thirds of incarcerated
adolescents").
245. See Sasha Abramsky, Taking Juveniles OffDeath Row, AM. PROSPECT, July 2004, at
A16 (citing the "troubling body of evidence" that supports this conclusion, gathered by experts
such as Ohio Northern University law professor Victor L. Streib). About one-third ofjuveniles
on death row were white as of 2002, compared to three-quarters of victims, suggesting that a
higher percentage of minority juveniles on death row have been convicted of killing a white
victim. See Victor L. Streib, Executing Juvenile Offenders: The Ultimate Denial of Juvenile
Justice, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 121, 128-130 (2003) (noting that "it appears that executed
juvenile offenders... are more likely to be offenders of color condemned for killing female
victims")
246. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PROTECTION, JUVENILES IN CORRECTIONS
9-13 (2004), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/202885.pdf(last visited Feb. 24,
2008) (finding that minority youth account for 70% ofjuveniles held in custody for violent
offenses, that a disproportionate number of minorities are in residential placement, that custody
rates are the highest for blacks, and that minority disproportionality exists at various decision
points in the juvenile justice system) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see
also Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the
Conservative "Backlash", 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1576 (2003) ("The overrepresentation of
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harshest juvenile laws and policies are borne by our most vulnerable
populations must be broadly emphasized in order to promote specific reforms
and changes. This is true for the interrogation ofjuveniles as well as for other
issues of concern to juvenile justice advocates-from the proliferation of
juvenile transfers to adult court 24 7 to the continued sentencing of juveniles to
life in prison without the possibility of parole. 48
Roper v. Simmons can serve as the catalyst and guide for such reforms.
By providing education regarding adolescent development and promoting
awareness of disproportionate minority impact, we can help alleviate Justice
Kennedy's expressed concern thatjudgments about juveniles' behavior will be
driven by misplaced and unjustified biases, prejudices, and stereotypes
regarding our communities' children.
VI. Conclusion
Analyzing Roper v. Simmons and what it might mean for the interrogation
ofjuveniles highlights the tension that has predominated in the law's approach
to juvenile crime. 249 As mentioned at the outset, during the past century the
focus of the legal system has shifted from protecting and rehabilitating young
minority youths in the juvenile justice system, as well as in concentrated poverty, makes
imperative the pursuit of racial and social justice.").
247. See Feld, supra note 246, at 1562-63 (stating that in the past two decades, almost
every state has revised its transfer laws to facilitate the prosecution of more juveniles in adult
court, and that such policies have had a disproportionate impact on black youth) (citing
JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE 216 (Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001)). Feld further
comments that "[a] high proportion of the juveniles transferred to adult court are minorities....
The preponderance of minorities among transferred juveniles may be explained in part by the
fact that minorities are disproportionately arrested for serious crimes." Id.
248. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT'L, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE
WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 39 (2005) (finding that blacks
constitute 60% of the youth offenders serving life without parole nationwide and whites
constitute 29%, with data showing that black youth are serving life without parole sentences at a
rate that is ten times higher than white youth).
249. The forum of juvenile court, in particular, is a hybrid-it looks to both civil and
criminal doctrine and relies upon the expertise of both lawyers and clinicians for its functioning.
See, e.g., Catherine J. Ross, Disposition in a Discretionary Regime: Punishment and
Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Justice System, 36 B.C.L. REv. 1037, 1040(1995) ("The juvenile
courts... exist in a twilight, neither wholly bound by the constitutional norms of criminal
procedure nor convincingly 'civil' and rehabilitative as envisioned by their founders."); Ira M.
Schwartz et al., Will the Juvenile Court System Survive?: Myopic Justice? The Juvenile Court
and Child Welfare Systems, 564 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 126, 128 (1999)
(exploring the difficult mission ofjuvenile court, expected "to fulfill the complicated dual roles
of societal disciplinarian that can punish and of parental substitute that can treat, supervise, and
rehabilitate").
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offenders to punishing and imprisoning them-and then back again. As a
result, we have seen court decisions that portray juveniles as vulnerable youth
overruled months later by ones that characterize them as violent predators.250
We have also seen cases such as Simmons follow on the heels of ones such as
Alvarado, with procedural and substantive disparities arising alongside them.
The reality is that such disparities exist because, as seen in courtrooms as
well as interrogation rooms, "American culture and law contain two competing
and conflicting images of young people., 251 In some contexts within the legal
system, they are considered to be vulnerable, incompetent, and needing of
protection, while in others they are the equivalent of adults, requiring no such
safeguards.25 2 As Professor Barry C. Feld has written, it is the role ofjuvenile
justice jurisprudence "to reconcile the fundamental ambivalence and conflicted
impulses engendered by these competing social constructs of innocence and
responsibility when the chiid is a criminal.'
Roper v. Simmons represents the latest-and most promising-attempt to
reconcile the competing images of the juvenile offender. Its significance arises
from its explicit recognition that adolescents are fundamentally different than
adults and that courts must draw bright lines to protect vulnerable populations
from the biases that predominate within American culture and law-whether
among jurors, police officers, or the judiciary. The time has now come to apply
Simmons's lessons to the area of juvenile interrogation: It is the age of the
child that matters.
250. Compare, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (prohibiting the
death penalty for offenders fifteen and younger in 1988), with Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361, 380 (1989) (upholding the death penalty for offenders sixteen and older in 1989),
abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see also Commonwealth v. Kocher, 602
A.2d 1308, 1315 (1992) (remanding for further proceedings in a bitterly divided opinion
addressing whether a nine-year-old should be tried for murder in juvenile delinquency or adult
court).
251. Feld, Juveniles' Waiver, supra note 129, at 106.
252. Id.
253. Id.
